* Kanafani, Ghassan. (1969) Returning to Haifa. Lynne Rienner Publishers
Before the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022, the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company (STEG) issued the document ‘Managing the Volatility of Renewable Energies using Hydrogen’21. This document argues that green hydrogen can enhance the resilience of, and ensure the optimal management of, Tunisia’s renewable energy sector, which is currently plagued by recurrent cuts due to the inability to control production rates throughout the year. As shown in a graph in the document, in those seasons in which the local consumption of electricity drops, it is currently unfeasible to exploit all of the electricity produced by renewable energy sources. The document argues therefore that adopting green hydrogen can provide an energy reserve to overcome this problem and it sets out necessary measures (albeit without detail) to be taken in order to reach the set goals, such as preparing a national strategic programme for green hydrogen and an action plan to identify how produced green hydrogen can best serve the national interest.
Thus, as also indicated in the STEG document, the main aim of producing green hydrogen, as initially stated, was to overcome the problems of intermittence and fluctuations created by the Tunisian Solar Plan22. However, due to the energy crisis in Europe (Germany in particular) over the last two years, as a result of the war in Ukraine, the aforementioned aim was abandoned as GIZ lobbied to steer the hydrogen plans towards exporting the majority of Tunisia’s green hydrogen production. GIZ achieved this through overseeing development of the National Strategy for the Development of Green Hydrogen and its Derivatives in Tunisia.
What alternative approaches could be applied to overcome the challenges set out in the National Strategy in a manner that benefits Tunisia, rather than fulfilling the EU’s neocolonial ambitions?
Before answering this question in regard to green hydrogen, it is necessary to first address the issues that have led Tunisia to adopt the approach set out in the GIZ-shaped National Strategy, and to allow foreign agencies to interfere in its energy policies. Perhaps the starkest example of this dynamic is the current Tunisian Solar Plan. The plan, which the government considers the optimal solution to the country’s energy crisis, has itself become a problem. It does not meet Tunisia’s actual requirements, but rather merely echoes the recommendations and dictates of the West (especially the EU). It is thus necessary to amend the plan by, first, reviewing the distribution of renewable energy projects to be implemented. The over-estimated amounts of wind power in the plan do not align with the specificities of Tunisia’s electricity consumption, notably, peak consumption during summer (when wind availability is limited) remains unaddressed. This means the country remains dependent on imported natural gas, especially in the summer (a peak period for demand), which poses problems with regard to access to electricity. As an alternative to wind and gas it is essential to rely on solar power, either thermal or photovoltaic, which allows for a relatively stable amount of electrical power throughout the year despite fluctuations in the summer, considering the country’s high levels of solar radiation. This will help reduce the consumption of natural gas and will ensure greater reliability of electricity supply when compared to wind power.
Moreover, it is also necessary to establish hydroelectric power plants (like Project Oued el Melah in the northwest). With a capacity exceeding 1,000 megawatts (according to a study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture for the country’s 2050 Water Strategic Vision)23, such plants can serve as energy reservoirs, storing electricity when the demand is low, for use when such demand increases (in the summer). This can help reduce recourse to electricity production from natural gas at such times.
Instead of pursuing the illusory prospects of exportation, it is vital to focus on the country’s needs, in both the short and long term: which means meeting the demand for personal and local consumption. This can be done through mobilising Tunisia’s available resources, reviving public investments, and promoting citizen initiatives that involve the collective exploitation of renewable energy projects.
The foregoing suggestions are initial sketches of potential alternatives that Tunisia can pursue. Further details on these alternatives are available in previous publications by the Working Group for Energy Democracy24. Moving forward, the focus will be on practical ways to tackle Tunisia’s energy deficiency and to boost development, especially in historically marginalised regions.
Turning to green hydrogen specifically, the priority here should be to review the National Strategy for the Development of Green Hydrogen and its Derivatives in Tunisia by reference to the national interest and the aim of meeting national demand, rather than following the dictates of foreign agencies whose sole purpose is to protect their countries’ interests. If such a review finds that investing in green hydrogen is indeed a necessity – due to the national interest, prevailing facts and global developments – then a national, comprehensive and multisectoral approach (that goes beyond the vision of just the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines) should be applied that will enhance the country’s development.
One possible use of green hydrogen produced in Tunisia would be in the manufacture of ammonia, a substance that Tunisia currently imports25, and which is used in the production of fertilisers. This could take place within the framework of a public–public partnership between the Tunisian Chemical Group, the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas, and the National Company for the Exploitation and Distribution of Waters. At the level of funding and exploitation, such a partnership could be facilitated by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of State Domains and Land Affairs, under the supervision of the Tunisian Government. As part of this envisaged process, the Tunisian Chemical Group would receive energy (generated through renewable energies) from the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas, and desalinated water from the National Company for the Exploitation and Distribution of Waters. Any potential surplus ammonia would be exported.
In regard to the lands used for the production of renewable energies within this process: partnerships could be established with the local populations living on or near these lands, involving them in energy production through new formulas such as cooperatives and community enterprises. Alternatively, local populations could be provided with plots of land for agricultural purposes, alongside receiving desalinated water that will allow them to engage in farming that is aligned with the local climate. Such projects, particularly in the south of the country, would yield economic and developmental returns with a sovereign, national dimension, and would be one way to invest natural resources for the collective interest (Desalination stations could also produce drinking water.) It is hoped that such an approach could keep the so-called Hydrogen Valley26 from becoming an unproductive valley.
The following diagram depicts this potential alternative to the hegemonic and neocolonial projects outlined by the National Strategy.