Compared to other parts of the country, the growth of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or CSOs in Arakan is relatively late, especially in the areas of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance provision. International NGOs, on the other hand, have mostly focused on the plight of Rohingya in Bangladesh and, to an extent, in Myanmar since the 1990s. Although different kinds of CSOs are functioning at local administrative levels, they are loosely organised and under-resourced, limiting their abilities to provide emergency support while their activities are highly restricted in the context of political repression which they daily face.
The situation reached a turning point with the country’s political opening in 2011 and the outbreak of inter-communal violence in Arakan in 2012. Subsequent events, such as the 2014 floods, Rohingya exodus in 2016-17 and intensified clashes between the AA and Myanmar military from 2018, provided a strong momentum for local NGOs and CSOs to multiply and strengthen. Due, however, to the 2021 military coup, civic space in Arakan faced a challenging security environment. This created division among groups who want to remain neutral by following restrictions imposed by the SAC and those who want to denounce the regime’s legitimacy by cutting off any direct relationship with its officials.
More recently, the authorities also announced that local NGOs and CSOs need to ask for permission from the SAC’s administrative bodies if they want to provide emergency assistance in the cyclone-affected areas. Local organisations, however, find it difficult – or are reluctant – to gain permission from regional authorities of the regime which is leading to delays and an insecure operational context. This directive contrasts with that of the ULA which, to date, has only required aid organisations to notify them about the basic information of their assistance so as to avoid overlapping programmes and to facilitate aid provision in the affected areas.
Currently, there are at least three groups when it comes to the roles of local NGOs and CSOs in emergency relief and recovery provision during the post-cyclone landscape. The first group includes those organisations that redistribute aid from international NGOs and United Nations (UN) agencies. The second category consists of local charity groups that redistribute donations and materials from individuals or organisations inside and outside of the country. And the third group use a mixed approach.
To date, the second group has been able to organise and deliver support better than the other two. However, apart from urban and peri-urban areas, they find that coverage to remote areas remains challenging. Like other organisations, they have their strengths, such the ability to mobilize resources quickly. But they also face challenges, including insufficient financial and material resources, insufficient data, lack of strategic disaster response policies, and questions over area prioritization.
While local NGOs and CSOs face limitations, they are not alone in this, and UN agencies and other international humanitarian organisations have also run into many difficulties. Since the cyclone, there has been resounding criticism over the position taken by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) as it waited for permission from the SAC authorities until it could provide emergency relief to disaster-affected areas. In contrast, many local sources confirmed that the World Food Program (WFP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided some humanitarian assistance in both SAC-controlled urban areas and ULA-controlled rural areas, including in Sittwe and Rathedaung townships, a few days after the cyclone.
These delays only worsened the suffering caused by the cyclone. The strike was devastating, and aid received by local communities was far from sufficient. Compounding these difficulties, the SAC issued a directive requiring humanitarian assistance from the UN and other international agencies to be delivered only through their ‘rehabilitation committee’ which consists of serving military officers. This was followed by another announcement requiring humanitarian personnel to travel only if they have obtained permission from the SAC. Such a demand is a clear violation of the core UN humanitarian principles of ‘humanity’, ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’.
In reality, these key humanitarian principles had already been violated when UNOCHA was unable to provide emergency relief due to its ‘lack of autonomy’ while it waited for a unilateral decision by the SAC. The consequences of this obstruction were reflected in the statement issued by the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (acting) in Myanmar on 14 June:
''Banning access to help needlessly prolongs the suffering of those who are homeless and without food. It increases the risk of food shortages and the risk of diarrheal diseases.''
Presently, there appears little likelihood for these deficiencies to be addressed. In its latest situation report, UNOCHA highlighted the overwhelming funding gap between humanitarian needs and funds available (US$ 333 million versus US$ 21.7 million received so far) as well as the continuing travel and communication constraints in the affected areas.