Ethnic nationalism among non-Bamar peoples
It is important to stress that the issue of ethnic nationalism is not simply a question of “Bamar-majority versus non-Bamar” peoples. Nationalism is also strong among non-Bamar groups. Since independence, this has been most obviously represented by the seven major nationalities who are demarcated by states of their own. But demands have also been increasing during recent decades among such peoples as the Kokang, Lahu, Pa-O, Ta’ang and Wa who also want self-administrative status or state-level recognition with defined rights within the Union.
Many of these movements and aspirations are long-standing. But, as the international door to the county opens, the increased advocacy of minority groups in Myanmar also reflects the rising trend of ethnic nationalism globally. Today “identity politics” are internationally in vogue. With this acceleration in ethnic consciousness, there come many questions as to how such aspirations can be accommodated in such a multi-ethnic land as ours. If, for example, we take the situation in Shan State, notions of homogeneity are a tall order. A vast highland plateau the size of England and Wales, Shan State is a vibrant territory in which populations and settlements are mixed and often overlap.
To some extent, stop-gap solutions have been offered under the 2008 constitution where "self-administered” territories have been demarcated for such peoples as the Danu, Pa-O and Wa. But these are only short-term remedies that will not settle the challenges of ethno-nationalism completely. Not only do armed struggles continue among such peoples as the Kachin, Kokang and Ta’ang, but inclusive agreements are yet to be reached in the government’s two main processes for ethnic peace and national reform: the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and the 21 Century Panglong Conference. For the past three years, government peace initiatives have been badly faltering, and it is clear that fresh ideas are needed in order to try and revive political dialogue and national understanding.
This challenge brings us to the point of considering what kind of theoretical frameworks are needed to overcome the complicated issues of identity and power-sharing in such an ethnically diverse land as “Myanmar”. Ethnic conflict has long been integral to the failure of the post-colonial state.
The intermeshing of civic and ethnic nationalism
Since independence, ethnocentrism – in the form of Burmanization – has become the main driving force of different governments under the criteria of “ethnic majority” rule. This is, without doubt, the most important obstacle that needs to be removed. To address this challenge, “civic nationalism” provides many answers. In practical terms, civic nationalism would mean the replacement of ethnocentrism with a framework of political checks and balances. Most obviously, these would include civil institutions such as elected legislatures and a reformed constitution, emphasis on the rule of law, equality of peoples, freedom of political and cultural expression, unity by consent and democratic pluralism.
Such principles are easy to lay out. But, in adopting civic nationalism, it would not be possible to disregard all features of ethnic nationalism entirely. Cultural or linguistic identity are key ethno-political dynamics. For this reason, a mixed model is suggested by theoreticians working in this field. As Margareta Nikolas of the Nationalism Project explains:
"Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism only provide the nature of the route towards their goal…a successful practice of nationalism is one where the process is an interaction of both civic and ethnic nationalism, an intermeshing of the two.”22
In other words, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism can be two sides of the same coin. But, for such a multi-ethnic state to succeed, it is essential that a modern “nation-state” has a consensual foundation that is acceptable to all: i.e. a common national identity. But if one dominant ethnic group has a monopoly on political, social and economic decision-making, then the result is likely to be inter-ethnic conflict. Evidence for this outcome can be seen in struggles currently taking place in many different places around the modern world.
This failure of the nation-state has very much been the experience of Myanmar. The lessons are compelling of the need to make change. In order to end the cycle of state failure, the model of ethnic nationalism practised in our country over the past seven decades needs to accommodate key features from civic nationalism.
This leads us to options in the political theory of civic nationalism that we need to incorporate into the existing concepts of ethnic nationalism that have not worked. In particular, we need to pay cognizance to the aspirations among not only the eight major ethnic groups, such as the Bamar, Karen and Shan, but also smaller nationalities and peoples who have similar hopes and goals: for example, Naga, Ta’ang and Wa. This will not mean simply adjustments to the constitutional map but a revision of understandings about the nation-state identity of the post-colonial Union. Political discussions need to be imbued with a different scope of discourse.
A road to solutions?
Many arguments can be picked out in support of civic nationalism. But, for this vision to succeed, there should be two fundamental starting-points.
- First, agreement on an environment of multi-cultural citizenship, equality and partnership that will be crucial to sustain peace.
- Second, recognition that nation-state formation using ethnic nationalism in the manner practised by governments after independence has failed to forge a common national identity that is acceptable to all peoples.
The explanation for these failures may appear complex in the field. But there is one inter-connecting reason at the heart of national politics: the leading social and political class, which is essentially an ethnic Bamar and military elite, have no vision as to how to build a common identity that supports representation and equality for all.
In confirmation of this deficit, a trail of failed policies and initiatives can be identified since the British departure in 1948. These include institutionalized assimilation, linguistic imperialism, a one-party state, Burmanization, the 1982 Citizenship Law and the flawed attempt to build a “Myanmar” identity on the basis of the prescribed existence of 135 “national races”. Under the 2008 constitution, Myanmar may be multi-ethnic in name, but it is not in socio-political practice. In the view of non-Bamar peoples, there has been a continuity in policies by different actors among the political elite to enforce and maintain the dominance of the Bamar-majority population.
The need, then, is to augment or replace the practice and notions of ethnic nationalism with those of civic nationalism. It has to be remembered that, in a successful multi-cultural state, nationalism produces nationhood and not the other way around. The concepts of shared heritage, common cultures and common ancestry cannot be written off; they are integral to the foundations of many modern states. But, through the promotion of civic nationalism, multi-culturalism will enhance rather than hinder the development of a common state identity. To achieve these ends, citizens must be able to rally around other societal goals besides those of ethno-nationalism. Key values in civic nationalism include the equality of peoples, shared political rights and allegiance to the same political procedures. The monopolization of governmental decision-making by one majority ethnic group has to end.
In the interaction between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism, a variety of ideas can be considered that promote a common national identity. Five propositions are listed below as food for thought, but they are by no means intended to be exclusive. At root, our country needs a different kind of roadmap for ethnic peace and meaningful reform. Such reflections should run parallel to the processes for political dialogue and governmental transition.
1. Adoption of principles from civic nationalism
Multi-cultural citizenship and democratic pluralism based upon civic institutions such as parliament and a reformed constitution need to be promoted and accepted. “Cultural nationalism” based around the misleading categories of the 135 “national races” is unrepresentative and does not reflect our peoples, identities and societies as they exist on the ground. The political and civic institutions of our country should embody the richness and diversity of our cultures rather than misrepresent the socio-political landscape and continue the rigid dominance of one major ethnic group.
2. Changes in political and ethnic labelling
On the surface this might appear controversial, but cognizance needs to be given to the fact that many names for identity or territory are inconsistent or contested. Many examples can be provided: e.g. Rakhine (Arakan), Kayah (Karenni), Chin (Zomi) and Bengali (Rohingya). Understanding of reflective terms for identity – whether local or national – will therefore be vital in the formulation of a shared sense of national heritage and culture. These reflections can happen after a satisfactory process of national reconciliation and political settlement, but they could also be deliberated during transitional negotiations. Open-mindedness will be essential to foster national discussion and inclusion. Without these essential steps that include all peoples, it will be difficult to forge a common national identity.
3. Innovations on the model of the “Federated Shan States”
It is often forgotten today, but the 1922 model of the Federated Shan States provides a precedent for a different kind of ethnic and administrative landscape within our country. Democratic innovations will be essential, notably elected legislatures. But such a system of devolved and holistic governance could be a way to satisfy state-level aspirations among smaller minority groups. One could even go further to change the name of Shan State to a shared state-level identity to satisfy all nationality groups living within the territory. Inclusion and consultation among all peoples are necessary if civic nationalism is to succeed. The historic experiences and formulations of Shan State, which reflect our long traditions and cultures, also have relevance for other ethnically diverse territories in the country.
4. Revival of language pluralism
Many countries in the modern world are multi-lingual, but such pluralism has been suppressed since independence in post-colonial Myanmar. It is a major source of grievance and disadvantage among non-Bamar peoples. This discrimination should be easy to address. The leading position of the Burmese language can be complimented with ethnic languages as optional second languages. This would include allowance for official usage as well as provision in the school curriculum. Non-Bamar languages would consist of the seven major (non-Bamar) peoples and smaller language groups that have sizeable populations. Further research would be needed, but this policy could be expanded as multi-language education is rolled out. It is long since time to return to the principles of “unity in diversity” – not assimilation – that were agreed by Aung San, Sao Shwe Thaik, Duwa Zau Rip and the Union of Burma’s founders at independence in 1948.
5. Promotion of virtual communities
The identities and cultures of endangered peoples can be empowered through the promotion of virtual communities, whether through online or offline connection. This is especially important in the case of peoples without exclusive territories and who may inhabit different sides of domestic or international borders. Many nationalities in our country face this challenge today. The key value is that virtual communities can energize the preservation and consolidation of ethnic identity without having inter-connected territories. They can still claim the representation and rights of a recognised nationality group.
In this respect, the Sámi indigenous solution can be looked at as an example. A people living on the Scandinavian frontiers of Europe, the Sámi reflect the experiences of minority peoples in Myanmar and the sub-Asian region who have failed to gain the recognition of autonomy or an independent nation-state. Like the Sámi, many ethnic groups in Myanmar also live in different territories or across international frontiers. Equally pertinent, during a time of rapid global change, the Sámi experience reflects the diversity of ways, socially as much as politically, in which marginalized peoples can take their destinies into their own hands in support of a better future. Ethnic peace and national recognition is not a gift from the state but it is built by the people (see Appendix: “The Example of the Sámi People”).
Conclusion
Our country is facing a host of grave challenges today. But amongst many needs, it has long since been clear that, if we want to resolve conflict and build national peace and security, it is essential to start with the divisive nationalist concepts that underpin the modern state’s formation. Four recommendations stand out.
As a first step, it is important to go back to basics and address the many disagreements and misconceptions over common heritages and cultural identity. After half a century under military rule, differences of opinion have been widening. At root, the Bamar governing elite has quite different views from those of non-Bamar peoples. Ethnic Bamar leaders promote the view that modern-day “Myanmar” stems from the time immemorial of a historic Burmese empire that was only disrupted by the intervention of British colonial rule. This, they believe, drove a wedge between Bamar and non-Bamar peoples. In contrast, ethnic nationality movements regard the post-colonial state as a new political entity that emerged only through political consensus at independence by virtue of such platforms as the 1947 Panglong Agreement and Union of Burma constitution. As such, the impositions of colonial rule should no longer have relevance to the 21st century challenges today. At the same time, it needs to be recognised that the territories that constituted pre-colonial “Myanmar” were a very different – and very multi-ethnic – world.
Second, and related to this, it is essential to recognise that the implementation of a state nationalism built around the criteria of one majority ethnic group is not working. The starkest evidence for this failing is the endemic condition of ethnic conflicts that have been continuing around the country since independence without any sign of final ending. It is impossible to estimate the humanitarian cost as well as damage to inter-societal relations. The ethnic nationalism, cultural nationalism and “union spirit” invoked in support of the Myanmar state are not comprehensive enough to embrace all peoples. Rather, they have sustained counter-nationalisms and alienation among different nationality peoples
Third, to address the limitations of ethnic nationalism as expressed in the country today, it is necessary to promote the criterion of “civic nationalism” that all the peoples can share. This should be the guiding principle for a harmonious society. This does not mean that ethnic nationalism will – or should – disappear. But all stakeholders in the country should reflect on the need for conceptual change, especially among the governing elite. The challenge is to bring together the characteristics of ethnic nationalism with civic nationalism to produce a blend that truly reflects the needs and interests of all peoples.
Finally, after seven decades of inter-ethnic conflict, inclusion needs to be the bedrock that will bring our country's peoples and stakeholders together. A start was made in 1948 to build a new union that all peoples could cherish, be proud about and confidently live with. But great suffering and damage have followed in the intervening years. It has thus fallen to a new generation to take this essential task forward. Peace and transformative change will not be possible until all share common goals in the building of a nation-state that all peoples, faiths and cultures can feel a genuine part of. Civic nationalism offers the prospect of new roads towards solutions. But there still remains very much in the way of political reform and nationwide peace-building that needs to be achieved.
Appendix: The Example of the Sámi People
The Sámi people, also known as Lapp, inhabit Lapland in Finland and adjacent areas in Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 With an estimated population of 80-100,000 people, they speak three main dialects that are considered to come from one language. In earlier times, the Sámi people suffered from assimilation programs in the countries they inhabit and nearly disappeared. Most Sámi are bilingual today. But following initiatives to foster their language and culture, they are now in a firmer position to promote their political rights whilst safeguarding their heritage and identity. In this respect, their model has lessons for many ethnic groups around the world. Their experience is applicable to smaller minorities in Myanmar.
Today the Sámi people are represented by three Sámi parliaments: in Sweden, Norway and Finland. A joint council of representatives, called the Sámi Parliamentary Council, was established by the three Sámi parliaments in 2000. In Russia, meanwhile, the small Sámi population is represented by non-governmental organisations. There are also important institutions that represent and promote Sámi culture, both locally and within the region. These include the Sámi University of Applied Sciences and Sámi University College in Norway. Academic links have been developed with other indigenous peoples around the world, and research and higher education are focused on the needs of Sámi society. In September 2007, Sweden, Norway and Finland all voted in favor of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while Russia abstained.24
In subsequent years, Sámi organisations in Russia have faced harassment. This is where the role of virtual communities has been a notable success in the preservation of Sámi identity and culture. In the digital world, the influence of virtual communities has been steadily growing in the sphere of politics among decision-makers and Internet groups who share the perception that their identities are under threat. In this respect, the Sámi people have proven an outstanding example in combining online and offline activity across international frontiers to preserve their language, promote their cultural heritage and strengthen political lobbying.
As Galina Gribanova and Maxim Nevzorov have noted, the Sámi movement has been successful in six key regards:
- Sámi nationalists have proven an inspirational example to other indigenous peoples
- they represent a divided people living in four countries
- the Sámi political environment may differ from that of Nordic countries and neighbouring Russia, but this has not prevented networking and collaboration
- by positioning themselves as one nationality, the Sámi have used the Internet to strengthen trans-border relations and send clear political messages to different government authorities
- online communication is not a replacement for offline politics, but it provides additional instruments to disadvantaged social and ethnic groups.25
Sai Wansai is a Shan political analyst and the ex-General Secretary of the former Shan Democratic Union.
This commentary is part of a TNI project funded by Sweden and does not necessarily represent the opinion of the funder.
Notes
1 See e.g., Transnational Institute (TNI), “Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing No.13, February 2014.
2 Bamar (5), Karen (5), Chin (3), Shan (3), Pa-O (2), Rakhine (2), Lisu (2), Akha, Intha, Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Mon, Rawang (1).
3 For a study of the ethno-political challenges in Kayah State, see, Tom Kramer, Oliver Russell and Martin Smith, From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State: A Land at the Crossroads in Myanmar (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2018).
4 Khin Zaw Win, “What lurks beyond the Belt and Road in Myanmar?”, New Mandala, 14 January 2020: https://www.newmandala.org/belt-and-road-in-myanmar/
5 See e.g., Chit Min Tun, “Without Territory, the Shanni Army’s Difficult Path to Recognition”, The Irrawaddy, 8 April 2019. There are few ethnographic studies on contemporary Shan-Tai peoples. But the Tai Leng are generally considered to constitute around 300,000 inhabitants in Myanmar today.
6 “Naga rebel group leader marks 40-year anniversary in jungle hideout”, Mizzima News, 3 February 2020. Naga people inhabit the northern borders of the Kachin State and Sagaing Region in Myanmar and Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland in India. See e.g., Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization: “Nagalim”, 26, April 2019: http://unpo.org/members/7899
7 For a recent overview, see e.g., Martin Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2019).
8 Peter Ravn Rasmussen, "‘Nations’ or ‘States’: an Attempt at Definition”, Global Policy Forum, 20 July 2001: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30341.html
9 Ibid.
10 Paul M. Johnson, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms: Nation”, http://webhome.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/nation.phtml
11 Rasmussen, "‘Nations’ or ‘States’".
12 Paul M. Johnson, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms: Nation state”, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/nation_state
13 Ibid: “Nationalism”: http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/nationalism.
14 Michael Ignatieff, “Civic Nationalism & Ethnic Nationalism”, Michigan State University: https://msu.edu/user/hillrr/161lec16.htm
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Historyplex, “What Does Cultural Nationalism Mean?”: https://historyplex.com/what-does-cultural-nationalism-mean
18 Peter Fuchs, “What is cultural nationalism and what are some examples of it?”, 21 August 2018: https://www.quora.com/What-is-cultural-nationalism-and-what-are-some-ex…
19 Richard Nordquist, “The Meaning of Linguistic Imperialism and How It Can Affect Society”, 31 July 2019: https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-linguistic-imperialism-1691126.
20 Anna Stilz, “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy”, Philosophy & Public Affairs. No.37.3, Wiley Periodicals, 2009, pp.260-61.
21 Galina Gribanova & Maxim Nevzorov, “Virtual Ethnic Communities as Political Actors: the Case of Sami People”, Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Vol.15.4, 2017, p.49: http://www.iiisci.org/Journal/CV$/sci/pdfs/PA003RU17.pdf
22 Margareta Mary Nikolas, “False Opposites in Nationalism: An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe”, Centre for European Studies, Monash University, 11 March 1999, p.13: http://www.nationalismproject.org/pdf/Nikolas.pdf
23 "Sami People”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9 January 2020: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sami
24 “Indigenous peoples in Sápmi”, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs: https://www.iwgia.org/en/sapmi
25 Gribanova & Nevzorov, “Virtual Ethnic Communities”, p.49.