Leaking Imperialism Tracing gas flows sustaining the settler occupation of Palestine

Iran’s ballistic missile attack and Israel’s failed ground invasion of Lebanon overshadowed unverified reports that “Iranian missiles had destroyed an Israeli gas platform off the coast of Ashkelon”.  Though the exact gas rig remains unknown, it is specified as the primary gas supplier to Israel. This calls into question Israel’s future energy security as it expands its genocidal campaign beyond Palestinian borders. Though Chevron (the platform operator) announced that production ‘resumed’ the following day, it is difficult to ignore the jump in oil prices that followed and wider concerns over oil and gas supplies from the region. Indeed, this is not the first time Israeli gas infrastructure has been a military target. In July 2024, Hezbollah launched a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle or drone) targeting the Karish gas production platform (owned by Greek company Energean). This platform supplies 34% of Israel’s domestic energy consumption and as such is considered a ‘strategic economic asset’ (former Energy Minister Karin Elharrar) that enables Israel to keep up its June 2022  ‘export agreement with the European Union and Egypt’. In general, this pattern reveals how energy infrastructure is becoming a critical battleground in the expansion of Israel’s military campaign, its energy security, and that of its gas clients: Egypt, Jordan and most recently Europe. These links prompted  Palestinian campaigners and organisers from the ‘Global Energy Embargo for Palestine’ to publish a call to action that includes the demand: ‘Stop importing Israeli gas’. This article is a response to this demand and the call for knowledge production on the flow of Israeli gas, as well as the history and politics underpinning it. 

This connection between the Israeli energy sector, national security and expansionist agenda is the result of numerous deals pushed by US and European diplomats that are meant to accelerate Israel’s economic integration within the region. The deals curate a dependency whereby countries like Egypt and Jordan become more reliant on and therefore invested in the existence of Israel and the protection of its energy infrastructure. This dependency has been institutionalised through a political and economic process of normalisation that takes shape in a variety of ‘peace’ deals between Israel and Arab states. Such institutionalisation began with Palestinians under the Oslo Accords but has since spread to Morocco, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sudan and elsewhere. But what is normalisation? And why is it important? 

The Palestinian National Committee of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BNC) defines normalisation as ‘participation in any project, initiative or activity, local or international, that brings together Palestinian (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (individuals or institutions)’. The organisation Ecopeace Middle East, previously Friends of the Earth Middle East, is a clear example of this. In this case, Palestinians, Israelis and Jordanians are brought together for peacebuilding and the creation of shared water solutions in a water-scarce region. Such a ‘coming together’ embodies normalisation as it ignores and entrenches Israel’s settler colonial project and its role in the region’s water scarcity. However, it is also important to consider how normalisation functions beyond individuals and institutions, and how it is actualised through transnational megaprojects that economically integrate the Israeli market within the region — like the water-for-energy deal between Jordan and Israel: Prosperity Blue-Green (Shqair 2023). On this global scale, normalisation is a mechanism of assimilation that maintains the existence of (settler) colonial structures and integrates them into other political economies (Dunlap 2017). As such, Israel and its allies use normalisation deals to naturalise the settler occupation of historic Palestine and the slow genocide enacted on Palestinians for 76 years (Shqair 2023). Furthermore, it presents economic and political cooperation with Israel as normal, legitimate or even an act of peace — thus shifting Israel’s geopolitical image from violent occupier to a strategic partner. Energy deals and climate policy have been pivotal tools in this process. Whether it comes via renewable energies, dubbed eco-normalisation by Palestinian researcher and activist Manal Shqair (2023), or ‘gas diplomacy’, the logic remains the same: Create new economic dependencies by melding Israel into regional and global energy markets, thus expanding its apparatus of settler colonial control beyond initial borders carved by imperialism. 

Previously, normalisation has been discussed mostly in relation to Arab nations. However, energy-centric normalisation is not bound to the Arab region. To consider it as such dilutes the impact and underestimates the Western outpost’s long-term expansionist agenda. For example, in June 2022, the European Union signed an agreement with Egyptian and Israeli officials that promised the purchase of ‘significant’ imports of Israeli gas exported via Egyptian liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals. Ever since, Europe has received irregular supplies of Israeli gas transported on LNG vessels across the Mediterranean, docking and offloading in various European ports.

We argue that it is impossible to understand the European imports of Israeli gas without contextualising them within a wider history of energy-centric normalisation that began with Egypt and Jordan. Therefore, we propose it is critical to conceptualise the growing synergy between the Israeli and European energy market as an expansion of the normalisation agenda and an imperial instrument that sustains the settler occupation of Palestine. Our article maps and analyses three important stages in the energy-focused normalisation process, while illustrating how it looks on the ground for local populations. First, we will examine Egypt’s role as a liquifier of Israeli gas, then move to Jordan as the facilitator commercialising Israeli gas, and finally the expansion of economic normalisation towards Cyprus and the European Union. We conclude with a call to action for Palestinian solidarity organisers across European ports to educate local communities and port workers on these imports of Israeli gas, and collectively strategise for tactical intervention on the gas trade to support a global energy embargo for Palestine.

Egypt is key to the normalisation process and the critical node for the export of Israeli gas to Europe. Israel’s only export route is through a subsea pipeline that skirts across the Palestinian coast, running from Ashkelon to Arish in the Sinai Peninsula. This pipeline was originally built to send Egyptian gas to Israel but since 2019 reversed its flow to support Egyptian demand with Israeli gas imports. A portion of this gas travels through the Arab Gas Pipeline to two Egyptian LNG terminals — named Idku and Damietta — that liquify the Israeli gas and then ship it on bulk carriers to Europe. Israel has no export infrastructure of its own, making this route through Egypt the only viable way to export excess gas production to the European market. However, with declining gas reserves this export comes at a significant cost to the Egyptian population who, as a result of energy-centric normalisation deals, are Israel’s primary gas client.

Egyptian dependency was made evident in October 2023, when Israel’s Tamar gas production platform was shut down amid security concerns. This meant the Leviathan gas reserve, normally used for export, was rerouted for domestic use — significantly reducing gas exports to Egypt. This had catastrophic effects for Egypt, whose own gas reserves (Zohr) have been in a steady decline since 2017, catapulting Egypt into widespread industrial shutdown and power cuts across the nation. The situation escalated during summer 2024, as rising power consumption is essential to combat the staggering temperatures. Day-time temperatures reached 49.6 degrees Celsius in the shade during the summer heatwave, while the population remained plagued by continuous electricity cuts resulting from gas shortages. Combined with organised abandonment by the Egyptian regime, the situation has been deadly for the working class and claimed the lives of 40 people in the Aswan province in Egypt on June 9 2024. The situation has afforded Israel significant power over the Egyptian ruling class, as Israel holds the power to turn off gas supplies and catalyse widespread dissent across the Egyptian population. But how did we get here? What is the story that led Egypt to become so reliant on Israeli gas and its infrastructural conduit to Europe? 

In a three-part report on Egypt’s gas normalisation deals with Israel, Ahamd Al Sayed details this narrative arc, highlighting that it has brought momentous losses for the Egyptian population. He shows how the initial 2001 agreement that contracted Egypt to sell gas to Israel — 7 billion cubic metres over 15 years for $3 billion — sold the gas below international prices and below the cost of production; bought at $1.5 to $1.7 (per million British Thermal Units) despite the cost of production standing at $2.65. As such, from the offset this normalisation deal incurred an unprecedented financial loss for the Egyptian state, with the Egyptian people ultimately bearing the brunt. This continued in 2005 when a new agreement was signed to provide a further 107 billion cubic metres of gas to Israel for 20 years. The latter agreement provided 40% of Israel’s gas demand, even as it still underpriced even larger quantities of Egyptian gas for a longer period. This deepened the deal's financial burden and long-term economic impact. Contextualised within a litany of chronic mismanagement and weak investment in the energy sector, Egypt became unable to meet its own domestic gas demand and suffered recurrent power cuts and blackouts under the Mubarak regime. Beyond the financial loss, these normalisation deals were a significant political betrayal of Egyptian people and their solidarity with the Palestinian resistance, as the state was now directly feeding the settler colony with the resources needed to continue its occupation. As such, these normalisation deals financially and politically entangled Egypt with Israel in a manner that primarily served the Zionist agenda at the expense of the Egyptian working class and their joint-struggle with Palestine. 

However, these normalising relations shapeshifted in 2019 as Egypt became the gas importer and Israel the gas exporter. This had huge implications on inter-state power dynamics, ultimately making a financially weakened Egypt dependent on Israel for its energy security. The shift began with widespread popular opposition to the 2005 gas deal. In 2008, a campaign was launched to stop gas exports to Israel, raising the slogan ‘No to the Gas Setback’, resisting the sale of underpriced Egyptian resources to Israel. This dissent was swiftly and violently squashed by Mubarak, but resistance anyway continued. The Ashkelon-Arish pipeline was subjected to attacks by Bedouin activists in the Sinai who torched the trans-Sinai gas pipeline, set up blockades to prevent Egyptian security forces from re-opening it and cut supplies for 45 days (El-Khazen and Rose 2024). Similar actions hobbled the Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO) pipeline from North Sinai to Jordan and Israel over the next four years. As such, in April 2012 EGAS announced the cancellation of the agreement to export gas to Israel, a process that necessitated an international arbitration committee and ordered the Egyptian national gas company to pay the Israeli Electric Corporation more than y $1.76 billion in damages. In combination with dwindling gas reserves, the Egyptian populace incurred further financial loss. Simultaneously, Israel discovered large gas reserves in Palestinian waters and along the border with Lebanon, transforming the Zionist state into an international player on the gas market via stolen reserves. US and European diplomats seized this opportunity to ‘catalyse greater regional economic cooperation’, spearheading gas trade deals between Israel and neighbouring countries. As such, in 2019 a new $15 billion deal was struck that reversed the flow of gas through the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline, now travelling from Israel to Egypt. At the time new discoveries (the Zohr gas field in 2015) fulfilled Egypt’s domestic gas demand, meaning the imported Israeli gas was predominately earmarked for export to external markets. This completely re-orientated regional power dynamics as Israel now held the power to turn off gas to Egypt, while Egypt held the infrastructural capacity to monetise the gas for Israel. As such, a back-door power struggle exists between the two regimes — mediated through gas — who at once both support each other's energy demands and/or ambitions, but also remain in competition to be considered the regional gas hub. As shown by Pete Moore (2005) in the case of the introduction of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan and Egypt, normalisation simultaneously entrenches and integrates economies of the region with the Israeli and US markets while intensifying capitalistic opportunism and competition between now rival, yet complementary, capitalists in the region. This dynamic creates contradictory effects as it shows how energy-centric normalisation has not only intertwined Israeli-Egyptian capital but manufactured a co-constitutive relationship between the ruling classes, with each reliant on the other to maintain and/or grow their value. 

Therefore, we witness how energy-centric normalisation extends beyond the borders of historic Palestine to fundamentally reconfigure the political economy of energy in Egypt. As the Egyptian regime strikes yet another deal with Israel to increase gas imports by 20 percent starting October 2024, this catalogue of energy deals has positioned Egyptian gas and/or its infrastructure in service to the maintenance of the Zionist expansionist project. Underpriced gas flowing into Israel from Egypt induced unprecedented economic losses that were readily displaced onto the Egyptian working class. Public pressure and disruptions that were aimed at halting the deal were also quelled, and resulted in Egypt having to pay billions of USD in damages and reconfigure its own energy sector from a gas exporter (at a loss) to a liquefier of gas for export, mainly to Europe.

While Egypt provides the necessary infrastructural conduit to export Israeli gas to Europe, Jordan is the original ‘commercialiser’ of stolen Palestinian gas. Without this initial component, export to Egypt, and further re-export to Europe, would not be possible. The gas fields operated by Israel needed an initial export agreement to be seen as ‘commercially attractive’ to international companies necessary to facilitate export. Indeed, in the early stages of gas discoveries, Israel was ‘disappointed’ by the reluctance to invest in its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), extending gas exploration bids to try and attract the international investment it was lacking. Supermajor oil and gas companies feared that an economic partnership with Israel would risk business with other Arab countries and Iran — the latter holding the largest gas reserves in the world. This meant that for several years only Noble Energy (a Texas-based corporation known to supply electricity to illegal settlements) and Delek Group (an Israeli company) operated the gas fields. The gas agreement with Jordan fundamentally shifted these dynamics — but how? And how has this affected the Jordanian and Palestinian populations residing in Jordan? 

In September 2014, just five days after an Israeli attack on Palestinians in Gaza, the government owned and taxpayer funded Jordanian National Electric Power Company signed a MoU to import large quantities of natural gas from Israel. At the time, the deal was secret and its terms were hidden from the Jordanian public (Bustani 2019). Two years after signing, the Jordanian government officially concluded the normalisation agreement, an agreement that stated Noble Energy and Delek Group would supply 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to Jordan over a 15 year period (Bustani 2019). The deal cost the Jordanian economy $10 billion and supplies 40% of Jordan’s gas demand. In September 2016, the classified deal was leaked to the media and thus its full text was revealed to the Jordanian population for the first time. The government’s refusal to publicly release the deal’s sensitive information demonstrates the intent to repress opposition to economic normalisation with Israel and slip the gas deal through unnoticed (Bustani 2019). As such, the Jordanian government creates a template for the ‘quiet advance’ of gas flowing from Israel’s Tamar field across the Palestinian borders. The gas deal between Jordan and Israel kicked off the energy-centric normalisation, providing a key stepping stone for the 2019 equivalent between Egypt and Israel.  

Jordan’s gas deal not only raised the political possibility for Israel to use gas to normalise relations with neighbouring states, but also altered the commercial viability of the Tamar and Leviathan fields by attracting the desired international investment. In 2020, the first experimental gas was pumped to Jordan through the Arab Gas Pipeline, that same year Chevron (a US oil and gas supermajor) announced an agreement to acquire Noble Energy, becoming the majority-owner and operator of the two largest reserves, as well as the Arish-Ashkelon export pipeline. In the following years, we have seen a ripple effect. In October 2023 Eni, BP. SOCAR (Azerbaijani-owned) and Dana Petroleum (Korean-owned) all bought licences in Israel’s EEZ on occupied Palestinian maritime waters. This demonstrates how the Jordan gas deal was the catalyst to turning Israel from a risky business investment to a strategic and commercially interesting prospect for the global energy market. Domestic demand alone did not make Leviathan a viable investment, making the agreement a ‘lifeline’ for Israel’s gas export potential within and beyond the EastMed region. This is confirmed by Jordanian energy minister who said ‘Jordan…gave Israel the ability to commercialise its own gas’.  As such, it is essential to view Jordan's economic normalisation as the essential building block that opened the floodgates to other energy-centric normalisation deals with Egypt and its eventual export to the European Union. 

Ultimately, it is the Jordanian people and Palestinians who paid the price for this deal. Jordan’s own energy security and independence has been sacrificed, as within the terms (paragraph 7.9) it stipulates that if Jordan discovers its own gas reserves it still cannot reduce the import of Israeli gas until it has purchased 50% of the total contracted amount. This has significant implications. Not only is Jordan now limited in its capacity to exploit local gas until 2031 (Hammouri 2020) but it is hostage to expensive imports for stability, particularly from Israel (Shqair 2023). The clause also completely de-incentivises oil and gas investment in the country. By setting quotas on the amount of gas that must be imported from Israel first, extracting gas locally is almost non-existent and remains an unattractive investment for energy supermajors. This is clearly evidenced through BP’s abrupt withdrawal from the Jordan Risha Gas project the same year Jordan signed the MoU with Israel. In short, the deal is designed to empower the Israel energy sector and economy, while enforcing Jordanian reliance on Israeli fossil fuels. Furthermore, the deal provides uneven cancellation terms that favour the American-Israeli corporations over the Jordanian corporations. As Jordanian Energy Minister Hala Zawati stated on Jordanian TV, cancelling the deal would be an enormous cost borne by Jordanian citizens. This crystallises the bond between the Israeli-Jordanian energy sectors, and curates a dependency that Jordanians cannot afford to break. Like the energy-centric normalisation deal in Egypt, the agreement completely reconfigures the Jordanian energy landscape, extending Israeli control over Jordanian energy security that is financially detrimental to challenge. This led to fierce opposition from the Jordanian working class who launched a revolutionary campaign to demand a ‘Stop to the Zionist Gas Deal’, voicing consistent dissent and anger about the terms of the deal and its normalising nature. Protestors considered it an act of ‘settler colonialism’ that was heavily orchestrated by the US to secure Israel and sacrifice Jordanian autonomy and self-determination over its resources and energy usage.  

In sum, it is clear how Jordan was necessary for Israel to present itself as a fossil fuel juggernaut to the region and Europe. Jordan was the commercial facilitator of Israeli gas, attracting the corporate investment and capital necessary to boost the Israelis economy at the expense of Jordan, its energy independence and citizens taxes. The deal also tied the 3 million Palestinians living in Jordan to their occupier’s gas, a well-rehearsed settler colonial tactic practised on Palestinians in Gaza for decades (Salamanca 2011: 22-37). This culminates in the expansion of Israel’s reach and its ability to control the lives and populations of Palestinians and Arabs residing beyond the borders initially carved by British imperialism. The price of the respective gas deals with Jordan and Egypt, that have been readily displaced on their respective populations, have also created the possibility for an EU-Israeli gas deal. 

Thus far we have mapped how gas-centric normalisation recomposed Egyptian and Jordanian markets and capital in Israel’s favour, and markedly accelerated a potential EU-Israel gas deal that had been in the pipeline for years. In June 2022, it materialised and a tripartite agreement was signed to allow ‘significant’ imports of Israeli gas to Europe for the first time. It was labelled a ‘historic agreement’ by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The MoU was signed two years after Jordan received its first gas and three years after Egypt signed its new gas deal — a short time in geopolitics. In addition, the discussions and signature ceremony were situated within the ‘Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum’ infrastructure, a forum co-founded by Israel and Egypt in January 2020 where the European Union had been granted ‘Observer Status’ in 2021. This shows how the groundwork was already being laid for this deal, creating spaces where the European Union could meaningfully capitalise on energy-centric normalisation. But why is Europe importing Israeli gas? And what is the significance of it? 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European nations have reignited their global ‘dash for gas’. This means that while there are reports that Russian gas is still fast-flowing to Europe through intermediaries like Ukraine and Turkey, the overarching strategy is to decouple the European market from Russian gas and seek alternative resources and routes. This strategy is clearly laid out in the REPower EU legislation that cites ‘drastically phasing down Russian imports’ and ‘diversify(ing) supplies’ as fundamental to the future of European energy security. For example, US LNG imports were essential to supporting Europe through its 2022 energy crisis — increasing to more than 42% of total LNG imports to Europe. Israel was also quick to position itself as a viable alternative  to Russian gas. The Israelis claimed they could replace up to 10% of European imports from Russia during a state visit to Germany — one of the European countries most vulnerable to cuts in Russian supplies (alongside Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary). However, the statement was considered ‘ambitious’ at best, particularly considering the small volume and infrastructural limitations of Israel’s energy exports. This fact was recognised by the EU 10 years prior when it dismissed Israel as a gas alternative due to the exorbitant cost it would take to transport the supplies to European shores. Though a litany of pipelines and projects have been suggested or prioritised on the PCI (Projects of Common Interest) List — such as the EastMed Pipeline — none have materialised nor seen the commercial backing necessary to be built. Indeed, in ‘Beneath Troubled Waters’, Lydia de Leeuw details that when the European Union considered Israel as a potential energy supplier in 2014 the conclusion was that ‘tensions between Israel and Gaza [...] and the maritime border disputes cast shadows’ on the opportunity, as countries seemed ‘unable to coordinate their plans for future exports’. As such from an early stage Israel was deemed an unfeasible alternate energy supplier to Europe. So, the question remains, why is Europe now buying ‘significant’ imports of Israeli gas? 

It is demonstrative of Europe’s political commitment to Israel. Despite European officials' initial hesitancy, the Israeli government and invested corporations continued to push for exports to Europe. The diversification from Russia strategy provided the perfect cover to implement it. Indeed, since the 2022 tripartite agreement, the European Union has been receiving imports of Israeli gas via LNG vessels. Research conducted by Movement Research Unit and Disrupt Power found that since October 2023 at least 9 ships have moved Israeli gas to European ports. It identified two companies repeatedly used to transport this gas: MaranGas and Seapeak LCC, and that the ships docked in multiple European cities. Ports repeatedly used since 2022 were: Piombino (Tuscany, Italy), Revanthussa (Greek Island), For Sur Mer (Marseille, France) and Milford Haven (South Wales)- and others used once included, Rotterdam Maasvlakte (Netherlands), Zeebrugge (Belgium) and Sagunto (Spain). Nevertheless, the gas quantities shipped are minimal and irregular, not going anywhere near to satisfying overall European demand. This is because Israel neither has the production capacity nor political stability to meaningfully shift European dependency from Russia nor increase the amount of gas the European Union has access to. Any claims otherwise are a clear indication of political motives. Indeed, the political and financial benefits for Israel are substantial. Access to the European market is a golden ticket for Israel to justify integration into the region, attract supermajor investment to build its reserves and make money through gas exports. Therefore, the push to support Israel’s gas market is about enabling these benefits and thus sustaining the settler occupation project without serious repercussions for Europe. This is further exemplified by the use of European weapons and military aid for Israeli gas infrastructure. This securitizes these gas supplies and the accompanying political benefits. For example, the Saar 6 Corvette warships and two submarines were made by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems for the protection of occupied Palestinian waters and gas infrastructure. This machinery is partially subsidised by the German government, showing how far Europe is willing to go to maintain these critical flows and continue imports.  

Altogether, this indicates how this agreement — like the others — is the next pillar in a normalisation agenda that creates energy deals that do not make sense for the gas recipient but do entail a political commitment to the future prosperity of Israel. As such, we must consider this 2022 MoU with the European Union as expanding normalisation by further integrating the settler colony into the world economy. Egypt and Jordan were about regional integration, the European Union is symptomatic of the wider agenda for global integration — situating Israel as indispensable energy partner during a time of energy crisis. 

As EU-Israeli energy integration grows, it is important to keep one eye on Cyprus; a regional player ready to capitalise on Israeli appropriated gas. Once a staunch supporter of Palestinian resistance — refusing to open an Israeli embassy until 1993 — the Republic of Cyprus swiftly reorientated its alliances after Israel discovered gas in the Levantine Basin. Two years later Benjamin Netanyahu became the first Israeli prime minister to visit Cyprus — a nation that is now one of Israel’s top trading partners across tourism, tech, the military and real estate. This fast-tracked and extensive cooperation is likewise reflected in the large number of Israeli families and businesses that have relocated to the Republic of Cyprus. This has led many to speculate to what extent the Republic of Cyprus is becoming a ‘Second Israel’ and indeed spotlight how Northern Cyprus in particular is undergoing a ‘silent occupation’ with an influx of Israeli settlers — raising anxiety over potential Zionist expansionism. But how is this growing synergy reflected in energy? 

The Republic of Cyprus has consistently advertised itself as the doorway to Europe, most notably in the Cyprus Gateway Initiative that pushes to monetise and transport EastMed gas through pipelines and liquefaction facilities in the Republic of Cyprus. For Israel, Cyprus is also the preferred infrastructural conduit to Europe. It has a smaller domestic market than Egypt — minimising the gas utilised for its internal consumption, thus maximising export capital gains — and serves Israel’s geopolitical interest to reduce its reliance on Egypt. Such intent was confirmed in September 2023, when Netanyahu visited Cyprus to meet with the Greek prime minister and president of the Republic of Cyprus. Energy was front and centre at that meeting. As the East Med pipeline project stalled in 2022, all eyes are on a 300 kilometre (km) pipeline connecting ‘Israeli gas platforms’ to a liquefaction station in Cyprus. From there, it will be shipped to Europe. Though discussions have since paused, the visit was a clear statement that Cyprus was Netanyahu’s preferred energy conduit. As European-Israeli economic relations grow, and political relations deepen, the role of Cyprus will be increasingly central to Israel’s expansionist project through energy and its explicit desire to economically integrate with Europe. Once a clear advocate of Palestinian justice, the possibility of an energy-centric normalisation deal with Israel has completely shifted Cyprus’s priorities, and political compass. What remains to be seen is how this will further impact the Southern and Northern Cypriot population, and to what extent — like in Jordan and Egypt — Israel will use energy deals to influence the Cypriot economy and expand its political grip on government officials to aid and abet its genocidal agenda. 

This article has exposed the process that led to Europe’s purchase of Israeli gas and reframed it within a history of energy-centric normalisation deals that began with Egypt and Jordan. As such it has de-exceptionalised Arab nations as the sole participants in normalisation and demonstrated how the same agenda underpins energy deals between Israel and the European Union. It has likewise demonstrated a pattern whereby energy-centric normalisation bolsters the Zionist expansionist project, carving the ability to control new populations' access to energy and natural resources in ways that generate financial losses that are then displaced onto the working class. This alternative framing is essential for understanding how Europe’s purchase of Israeli gas is as definitive an act to sustain the settler occupation of Palestine, as the provision of arms. Gas is not a neutral commodity; it is systematically weaponised to naturalise and legitimise settler colonialism, and its affiliated trade networks. This underscores why the Palestinian struggle is, and must be taken as, a climate issue. Such deals drive our increased reliance on fossil-fuel colonialism and perpetuate the unyielding profit of hydrocarbon corporations. They accelerate ecological devastation across countries like Jordan, Egypt and Cyprus, further binding them to settler colonial structures. Natural gas, therefore, is a political commodity, central to the proliferation and consolidation of imperial power in Palestine and beyond. We must confront the reality: without Palestinian liberation, there cannot be true climate justice. 

So what can be done? We must organise. It is critical to revive the anti-normalisation and anti-gas campaigns in Jordan and Egypt, and spread their revolutionary, anti-imperialist sentiments to Cyprus and Europe. We must create transnational solidarity networks that mirror the supply chains of normalisation and countermap them with resistance and mobilisation. Within European borders, it is vital we no longer see ourselves as divorced from the process of normalisation but central to it. We must mobilise in ports, build strong, reciprocal relationships with port workers (Ziadah and Fox-Hodess 2023) and activate political education programmes in port cities and with their communities to bring the topic of gas and LNG together with conversations on Palestine. Collectively, we can resist the energy-centred normalisation we are all implicated within. 

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