In Which Direction is the Lahu National Cause Heading? A Myanmar Commentary by Kyar Ui*

The Lahu population in Shan State, Myanmar, can mainly be found to the east of the Salween River. There are no reliable statistics. But here they are the second largest nationality group after the Shan.1 Smaller numbers reside in the Tanyang area of northern Shan State and in the Kholam area in the south. In particular, about 100,000 Lahu people are inhabitants of the Wa region in eastern Shan State. Unlike such peoples as the Wa and Kokang, however, the Lahu were not afforded the recognition of a self-administered ‘zone’ or ‘division’ under the 2008 constitution. Further afield,  Lahu communities can also be found in China, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos.

The Lahu people can generally be divided into different sub-groups, each identifying itself by the colour of their traditional dress. The two biggest groups are the Black Lahu and the Yellow Lahu. The Lahu also have their own language which for many centuries was only known in spoken form. In the 1970s, however, Western Christian missionaries started to develop a Lahu script, mainly to translate and publish the bible in Lahu language, and as a result the written Lahu language uses the Roman alphabet. 

Until the present day, the Lahu are known to be good story tellers. One important tale that is passed down through the generations is their tale of origin. According to this story, the Lahu in Myanmar originated from Yunnan Province, China. Upon their arrival, they started to live upon the mountain tops of Shan State after being chased away from their ‘Mvuh Meh Mi Meh’, as they call their original homeland.2 As a result, the Lahu do not like to live under the authority of other people and have often been regarded as ‘unruly’ in history.

Nowadays most Lahu still live in the uplands, and their villages can be found on top of the mountains in remote areas. Each village has its own customary land tenure system, with land demarcations indicating the border between neighbouring villages. According to the customary land tenure system, the land around a village is shared among the villagers. A household that is clearing a piece of the forest for the first time will be considered to be the owner of that piece of land. They are the owners in the sense that they can decide on the crops cultivated there and when to shift cultivation to another piece of land. They cannot, however, sell the land to others. Thus new villagers arriving from other places are dependent on the village headman and elders to decide on their access to village land. For the moment, the Lahu who practise customary land tenure live in remote areas and still have access to enough land to live off. In contrast, the Lahu who have ceased to practise customary systems are often faced with a shortage of land after selling or moving off their land.

In addition to farming, the Lahu are hunters and fishers as well as foragers in the forests surrounding their villages. The staple crops on their fields include rice, mustard leaf, corn, pumpkin, coriander, chilli, beans, ginger, garlic, onions and soybean. Many Lahu still practise shifting cultivation to keep the soil fertile.3 They do not need fertilizers nor use pesticides. Instead, they weed their fields which are prepared after the Water Festival at the end of April. Planting and sowing are then carried out before the rainy season starts at the end of May or beginning of June. Harvesting time is during October and November.

The Lahu are also known for opium cultivation. Opium has an important role in Lahu society and in the village. It is consumed and offered to guests in wedding ceremonies and at funerals. Opium is also used as a medicine for the people to treat common colds, fever and diarrhoea in remote villages where health services and medicines are not readily available. It is effective as a pain killer, and it is also provided to livestock for similar use.4 Occasionally, men use opium for recreational purposes as well. The opium planting season also differs from food crops. Planting starts in September and harvesting happens in January. As such, the opium crop acts as an economic safety net. If the food crops are damaged by floods or eaten by rats, opium can be used as a cash crop to buy food.

Lahu villagers work closely together in daily life and help each other with heavy work, such as clearing the fields or ploughing. At harvest time, households support each other by first working together on the field of one household before moving to the fields of the next household. Two years ago, a road was built west of Mong Ping, allowing for easier access into Lahu-inhabited areas. Many Lahu welcomed the road because it allows them to bring supplies to their villages and products to the markets. But others are worried because the road will increase the export of teak and forest products from the customary lands of the Lahu people to the central part of the country. As this happens, they are concerned about the ways in which the road will impact on their culture and sustainable ways of living among Lahu communities who inhabit the mountains. In the 21st century, the lives of the Lahu people are under increasing pressures and strain.

Myanmar has suffered from military rule and armed conflict for over seventy years. In these struggles, many nationality peoples have taken up arms to defend their communities and press for autonomy. Most of these ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) seek to establish a federal union based upon democratic principles. The main EAOs with a presence in eastern Shan State are the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the United Wa State Army/Party (UWSA/P). 

As these conflicts continue, the Lahu do not have their own political territory, and they live in areas administered by EAOs or the central government. As a result, many Lahu boys and young men have been conscripted as soldiers into the armies of the RCSS, UWSP and also the government. Some Lahu are even high-ranking officers in the UWSP and RCSS, and the vice chairman of the UWSP, U Yaku, is an ethnic Lahu from Weng Kao District. It is estimated that 15% of the population under the control of the UWSP is Lahu, mainly concentrated in Mong Pawk District.

In these areas, Lahu and Wa have been living together for a long time and both can be considered mountain people. As a result, the Lahu are allowed to practise their customary land tenure system, shifting cultivation and farming without machines close to streams in order to irrigate their lands. In 2018, however, tensions arose when the commander of the UWSA’s 468 Brigade Commander evicted some Lahu villages near Mong Pawk in order to expand the city, and he also cracked down on Lahu Baptist Bible schools in Mong Pawk and Ho Tawng townships. During these operations, some pastors, church leaders and students were initially detained but later released.

In general, neither the RCSS  nor UWSP have tried to invade ethnic Lahu regions, and they live in peace with Lahu communities. In line with their history, the Lahu have a tendency to move around. As a Lahu saying goes, “when we feel it is time to move, we do.” For this reason, RCSS and UWSP leaders know very well about the Lahu way of life and allow the Lahu people the space that they need. 

The Lahu became active in national politics during the early days of Myanmar’s liberation struggle. First, some Lahu joined Aung San’s independence movement on an individual basis against the British rulers. Then Lahu volunteers joined the new Burmese army, today known as the Tatmadaw (Sit-Tat), in 1950 to fight the Kuomintang invasion into Shan State after it was pushed out from Yunnan Province by Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army in China. 

In following decades, the Lahu nationalist movement was largely able to keep apart from the armed conflicts in other parts of the country. But the situation began to change after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), with China’s backing, invaded eastern Shan State in 1968 with many Lahu areas east of the Thanlwin River coming under CPB control. Unity was retained under the influence of Pu Kyaung Long, spiritual leader of the Lahu, as local resistance spread, and in 1975 the Lahu National United Party (LNUP) began armed struggle against the military socialist government of Gen. Ne Win to demand self-determination.

The following years between 1975 and 1985 were filled with conflict between the Lahu and Myanmar military, especially in Mong Hsat and Mong Tong townships. The LNUP, however, was weakened by a split which saw a breakaway group work with the CPB, and in the early 1980s the Lahu political cause began to lose its drive under a lack of new leadership after Pu Kyaung Long passed away. In the meantime, the armed movement did not develop clear principles during ten years of fighting; there was no clear end in sight; and the Lahu people remained uncertain about the future direction of national politics. 

Since this time, the Lahu armed movement has been reformed several times, and in 2008 it was renamed as the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), often working with other EAOs in Shan State and Thailand borders. But it remained a marginal force within the country. Subsequently, the Lahu National Development Party (LNDP) was also established following the 1988 democracy uprising as a political party to participate in the 1990 general election. One candidate, Daniel Aung, won a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) for Mong Ping township. Unfortunately, he had no opportunity to represent the Lahu people after being forced into exile to avoid arrest after the military government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council began hunting down National League for Democracy (NLD) and other pro-democracy MPs. For the next two decades, the Lahu party ceased to exist on the political stage. 

The national landscape only began to change during the era of quasi-civilian transition following the introduction of the 2008 constitution (2011-20). Under the Thein Sein presidency (2011-2015), a new ethnic ceasefire process was initiated, with the government holding talks with over twenty EAOs. These included the LDU even though it was not very large in terms of manpower or territorial control in comparison to other groups. On this basis, the Myanmar military refused to allow the LDU to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), arguing that it was too small and had only a few soldiers. Some very strong EAOs, however, were also excluded, notably Kokang, Rakhine and Ta’ang, and for this reason a majority of EAOs refused to sign the accord, saying that it was not inclusive. Only eight EAOs signed the NCA at its 2015 inception.

In 2018, however, the Lahu national resistance was invited to join the NCA during the time of the NLD-led government. Together with the New Mon State Party, the LDU agreed to sign the accord on 12 February 2018, bringing the number of NCA EAO signatories to ten. It was an important moment. The signing of the NCA provided acknowledgment of the armed struggle fought by Lahu movements in the 1970s and 1980s. It also allowed young Lahu people to learn about this part of their Lahu history. The NCA, however, did not prove meaningful to the Lahu cause since it did not bring any real political progress or recognition. To the NLD this did not seem to  matter. The priority seemed to be bringing two more EAOs into the NCA as proof of their quest for peace in the country.

A similar impasse existed on the political stage. A new round of a Lahu movement led by the LNDP re-surfaced in the 2010 general election which was organised after the adoption of the controversial 2008 constitution. Subsequently, three LNDP candidates won seats in the 2015 general election: for Mong Man township in the Shan State Parliament, Matman in the Wa Self-Administered Division, Shan State, and as Ethnic Affairs Minister for the Lahu population in Shan State. Against this backdrop, the LNDP was able to strengthen Lahu national organisation to some extent, becoming active in the democracy and human rights movement during the 2015 to 2020 period. There was, however, no reform breakthrough.

Meanwhile, it is important to note that, as today, many militia (pyithusit) groups remained active in Shan State during these years, who are officially under control of the Myanmar military and used to counter the influence of EAOs. This also has impact on politics and society. Many militia have long been involved in illicit businesses, including drugs production and trafficking. In the Lahu case, the Tatmadaw facilitated the accumulation of wealth by certain militia leaders in the past. As a result, their business interests led to an unwillingness to oppose the military, even up until today. Instead, to try and gain recognition in local communities, Lahu militia leaders give donations to church organisations hoping for spiritual clearance.

Evidence of militia in Lahu areas can be widely seen. There is at least one militia in operation per village tract, and their only goal is personal profit. When people wear a militia uniform, no questions are asked by the authorities, and they can be involved, almost freely, in illicit activities. Generally, they understand the lives of the Lahu people. But Lahu militia leaders are also said to be involved in the drugs trade, further increasing their wealth. More recently, militia groups in Shan State have attracted international attention after allegedly helping human trafficking businesses move their casinos and scam-centre factories from the China to Thailand border areas.

The momentum of the Lahu nationality movement under LNDP leadership came to an immediate halt due to the attempted coup by Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw generals on 1 February 2021. The coup also had negative consequences for the Lahu armed movement, causing a division within the LDU between a group willing to accept and recognise peace invitations by the State Administrative Council (SAC) and those resisting the coup and refusing to participate in peace talks organised by the Myanmar military. As a result of the absence in unified leadership, Lahu people were very disappointed and the LDU lost popular support.

In contrast, the LNDP did decide upon a clear course. They did not accept the military attempt to take over power, and the party was not found in the list of parties which re-registered under the new political party registration law amended and adopted by the SAC in 2023. This decision by  the LNDP was highly supported and commended among Lahu youth. A similar sentiment can be found among many youths of other nationalities regarding ethnic political parties who did not register with the SAC because of their disapproval and distrust.

The political future is presently uncertain. Many grave challenges remain to be addressed. But the LNDP does stand out in one regard. Most political leadership in Myanmar is carried out by men. But interestingly the LNDP is currently chaired by Daw Aye Thi Tar, a woman from Mong Ping. As a result, the LNDP is one of only two political parties in the country with a female chairperson (the other is the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi). Daw Aye Thi Tar started working with the party in 2011 and has always been very active in women’s rights, land rights and engagement with civil society organisations, helping define the party’s position on human rights and strengthening the LNDP movement. She became the party chairperson in 2019. Since the coup, political work is not possible and presently LNDP supporters are mostly focusing on humanitarian issues in Lahu communities.

Generally, Lahu communities are not in the front-line of conflict today but they face many crises just the same. As described above, many Lahu villages are located in isolated and mountainous areas where they grow opium as a cash crop to buy food as well as for traditional and medicinal purposes. In these areas, the UWSP and RCSS collect 10 per cent of the opium harvest as a tax. In contrast, Lahu villagers do not have to pay tax to local militia leaders because these groups have other ways to make money. 

The Lahu people are also worried about the use of methamphetamines. It is said that ten percent of young men in Lahu villages are using this drug. To try and prevent this, some villages do not  allow use inside the village boundaries and, in these cases, users go outside the village, often somewhere in the forest. But if the users do not steal, then they are not punished for their drug use. If they do steal, for example, a rooster to sell and buy methamphetamine, they will be punished for stealing but not for using. In some Lahu animist villages, alcohol is also not allowed and people similarly have to drink outside the village boundary. The availability of alcohol, however, is low since it has to be bought and carried from a market. With regards rice wine, the Lahu depend on the Akha people who are known to produce very fine-tasting wine.  

Conflict and the state of insecurity are also having impact on social relations. Lahu women are generally regarded the boss at household level, the household bookkeeping is done by women, and they are in charge of the family money. Women are also involved in village meetings and problem-solving. Nowadays, however, village heads are mostly men because of the security situation and  conflict. Village heads have to travel to other villages, sometimes during the night, to solve social and administrative problems or they have to negotiate with the Myanmar military or EAOs on behalf of the village. Such situations are not considered safe for women.

The village head is also a challenging position. A village head is appointed for one year, and then a new person will be appointed because it is a risky position and not easy to help fellow villagers. It takes time, there is a lot of work, and there is no salary paid. The only payment that a village head will receive is part of the neck of a pig when it is slaughtered in the village. But sometimes people even forget to give this. Meanwhile, depending on location, the village head may have to negotiate with multiple authorities.

A similar dilemma faces other groups in Lahu society. Lahu religious organisations generally do not collaborate with the SAC. They operate independently, most did not accept the coup, and they pray for the country to be peaceful. In church on Sundays and on their Facebook pages, they reach out to pray for peace. Lahu Baptist Convention pastors show their support to the students, while Catholic groups sympathise with ethnic Kayan and other faith-related communities in areas of conflict. Animist religious leaders, for their part, are mostly village-based. Some Lahu individuals also practise Buddhism, especially those working with the government, but these Buddhists do not support the coup.

Meanwhile many Lahu youths have joined anti-coup protests in their respective localities.  Some university students attempted to revitalize the armed resistance movement after witnessing brutal crackdowns with excessive force upon young Lahu people protesting in the streets. But it is still uncertain if the general Lahu population is aligning with youths and their political goals. It is equally unclear how Lahu people would accept and support an armed movement under the leadership of educated youth.

It will therefore be very important to watch how they will engage and mobilize Lahu people to support their political cause; how well they reshape the new political landscape and refresh the Lahu wish for self-determination; and, especially, how effectively they manage to break free of a long history of proxy militia rule, most of the time established by the Myanmar military with lucrative incentives. 

In summary, we Lahu young people need to face up to the current challenges in the country, and we need to take action for our people and our rights. Every Lahu has the responsibility to assess the current political crises and use them as opportunities to upgrade both Lahu politics and our social and living standards. 

* Kyar Ui is a young Lahu activist. For the past seven years he has been working on Lahu community development and providing human rights training in eastern Shan State.