The Editors' Statement:

Current Developments and Recommendations

How do we put an end to war?

Germany has been taking part in NATO's war in Afghanistan for eight years now, a war which cannot be won by military means. The longer it continues, the greater the feeling of helplessness. Even supporters of the war are no longer convinced of the wisdom of calling for "more and more of the same". Our focus therefore deals with the question: How do we put an end to war?

Analyse wars more realistically

We can only develop viable strategies for putting an end to wars and uprisings in "failed states" if we have a clearer picture of the wars currently taking place. The most urgent challenges facing peace and security policy today are no longer inter-state wars, where regular armies fight for victory. Admittedly, these continue to exist but the situation since the 1980s is characterized by uprisings or wars between guerrilla movements and the state which they are fighting. In addition, we are also seeing genocide, terrorism and piracy, whose humanitarian and economic consequences and political significance are very similar to those of wars. Treating such violent conflicts in the same way as conventional wars makes it more difficult to resolve them and contributes towards their escalation. The absurd "war on terrorism" is a case in point.

Do not overestimate military potential

Many current wars cannot be decided on the battlefield because there is often no such battlefield nor an identifiable army which the state or external interventions could fight against using regular troops. Attacks, assaults, ambushes, massacres or forced displacements take place within the affected societies themselves, very often without a central leadership. Their perpetrators are often indistinguishable from the rest of the population. Nevertheless, many people believe that more soldiers mean more security and that such wars can be won with more combat troops. This may apply to most conventional wars, in which regular armed forces confront one another and victory falls to the prevailing side; but such wars are rare today.

The population is at the centre of civil wars – both as perpetrators and as victims. Some people take part in battles, massacres and attacks as combatants or abettors. They do not only suffer from the wars, they also

play an active role in them. The population becomes the most important strategic target of warfare. A change of regime involves contradictory concepts of political order – for example, the attempt to set up a religious regime in Iraq or the West's efforts to establish a regime which no longer provides a breeding ground for terrorism in Afghanistan. These changes can only be implemented with the support of the population. It is their loyalty that determines the outcome of war, not military battles. Military operations can undermine this loyalty if they involve a high civilian death toll or support an unpopular government. Committing further troops to defend a state which has virtually no presence outside the capital or which is rejected outrightly – because it is repressive, incapable or corrupt – is doomed to failure and only serves to prolong the war. The Soviet Union experienced this situation in Afghanistan, as did the United States years earlier in South Vietnam. Military strategies are only successful if they have the support of the population. The people will provide this support if they consider the political framework conditions to be legitimate, if their security situation improves perceptibly and if they are provided with alternative sources of income.

Strengthen citizen-oriented statehood

However, it is not sufficient to simply enhance "military security" with "development". Of course, providing services for the population and building infrastructure are just as valuable as humanitarian aid, but – taken on their own – they do little more to put an end to wars than strengthening military forces. Military and development aid measures are not strategically decisive when it comes to putting an end to a civil war. They only have an effect if they are elements of efficient state, para-state and societal governance mechanisms. Citizen-oriented statehood must – wherever possible – be combined with societal governance structures and extend from the capital into the remotest villages if it is to win the support of the people. The approach must therefore be to strengthen such control mechanisms, particularly the legal and police systems, and to use development cooperation and security policy to serve this form of successful statehood.

Negotiated solutions based on agreements between illegitimate actors of violence may calm the situation temporarily but seldom lead to sustainable peace. There have been a variety of negotiations, ceasefires and

peace agreements in Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Somalia and in Palestine which have all failed or are threatening to fail. Peace through negotiation presupposes a will for peace and a willingness to compromise on the part of the political leadership and the population as well as the control of armed units by the leadership, which is often not the case. The success of negotiated solutions in Sudan, Congo, Somalia, Palestine or in Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on effective and legitimate statehood. Putting an end to wars in fragile or collapsed states is particularly difficult due to the absence of authoritative and legitimate stakeholders.

The community of states plainly demonstrates greater willingness to use military intervention than to participate in the tedious reconstruction of states. In the rare cases where the community of states or the West have been prepared to become involved in lengthy transformation processes following a military intervention, the question arises of when and how to end these *de facto* protectorates. Despite significant progress, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo will not be pacified as long as there is a contradiction between democratization and heteronomy.

Guarantee security of opposing forces

There is no general formula for ending wars. But if peace cannot be achieved through military victory or through the hegemony of a protectorate, the warring opponents must be recognized as partners in a ceasefire and persuaded to conduct peace negotiations. This includes offering security guarantees for all parties in the conflict. After all, anyone who feels more threatened following a ceasefire than before will not abide by the rules of a negotiated peace. It is counterproductive to expect capitulation or unilateral demobilization as a precondition for a peace process. Confidence in the peace dividend takes time to grow. In view of the high risk of renewed violence following a ceasefire, the community of states must introduce strict and credible sanctions to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is observed. Combatants are often only able to maintain their strength due to external support, which provides them with safe havens or supply lines for weapons and trade. Measures to end a war should therefore involve all the neighbouring states in drying out the resources of war and implementing ceasefires and peace agreements. Of course, one cannot overcome mutual distrust at the stroke of a pen. However, measures to

prosecute war crimes and efforts towards reconciliation which at least provide the victims with moral justice can gradually help to reduce this distrust.

Involve neighbouring states Wars mostly take place simultaneously at the regional, national and local level. At the local level, traditional mechanisms of conflict management should be used wherever possible, even if they do not meet western standards, providing that they do not involve the use of violence. Although a peace agreement must include all combatants, the peace process should not lead to the permanent conferral of power and patronage to perpetrators of violence. The various stages of the transition to democratically legitimized statehood based on the rule of law must therefore be clearly defined as goals.

Afghanistan and Pakistan as central tasks of peace policy

The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated drastically since 2004. There has been a huge rise in the number of civilians and security personnel killed. The number of bomb attacks increased tenfold between 2004 and 2008 and the number of attacks by insurgents rose by more than 50% between 2007 and 2008. In the meantime, the formerly peaceful North is also unsafe. But this wave of violence must be regarded as a symptom rather than as the actual evil. Factors such as setbacks in the country's political development and deficient state structures weigh more heavily than the security situation.

The *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) is intended to support the government. But this is not working because the state is scarcely present in rural areas and also has little to offer the people there. The government is increasingly being perceived as a problem rather than a solution as corruption, excessive centralization, drug trafficking and cooperation with autocratic warlords meet with disapproval. The international troops are identified with the discredited and largely fictitious

state apparatus which they are seen to be supporting – and this is grist for the mill of the insurgents.

Strengthen basic state structures

Rather than increase their troops, external actors should support state and societal governance structures, not just in the towns but throughout the whole country. Every Afghanistan strategy stands and falls with legitimate statehood at the basis of society. The Europeans must take this aspect into account since Washington's new policy of increasing troop levels is failing to do so. Foreign military support will only contribute towards establishing peace if the state starts to play an active role in the provinces and villages, and if the people see that it is at least partly taking care of their interests.

Combine negotiations with reconstruction

In recent months, many people have been calling for talks with the "moderate" Taliban or even with radicals. Such negotiations are wise in order to calm the situation in individual regions wherever possible. However, they could play into the hands of the Taliban as there are also signs that the government is facing collapse. NATO seems to regard such negotiations as a mere tactical instrument for dividing and weakening the Taliban. It is therefore avoiding this urgently needed change of course. Enduring peace cannot be achieved through a compromise between heterogeneous and unreliable conflict parties because this does not overcome state shortcomings but serves to exacerbate them. Negotiations must be coupled with the restructuring of political framework conditions: Top priority must be given to building up local and regional state institutions, thus reducing the risk of tyranny. This has also become evident in Pakistan's Swat Valley, where negotiations under the conditions of failed statehood have led to an extremist reign of terror. In Afghanistan, however, negotiations based on socially accepted institutions could at least partially unite the two sides. These talks can and must be accompanied by cooperation with Iran and Pakistan as well as with Afghanistan's neighbours in the North. All this presupposes that the United States will finally resume diplomatic relations with Iran; furthermore, the West must also alter its policy towards Pakistan.

Pakistan is threatening to become collateral damage of the war in Afghanistan. This war has spread to the country's tribal areas, which have close ethnic links with Afghanistan and are hardly integrated in Pakistan and

where there is little opportunity for political participation. From here, the war has spread to further parts of the North West Frontier Province, particularly because Pakistan's armed forces are considered a lackey of the United States. Last year, warlike violence in Pakistan cost more lives than in Afghanistan. Now terror attacks are spreading throughout large areas of the country. Should they succeed in destabilizing the entire country, this would have unforeseeable consequences far beyond the region – Pakistan has a population of 170 million and there are millions of Pakistani immigrants in Great Britain and other western countries. Pakistan also has nuclear weapons.

Focus on Pakistan

Far greater attention must be devoted to Pakistan than has been the case in the past. Stabilizing Pakistan is just as important as stabilizing Afghanistan. One should not treat Pakistan as a mere secondary theatre of the war in Afghanistan and regard sealing its borders as the central political objective. This is in any case virtually impossible, particularly as such attempts by the Pakistan army are the main reason for the war spreading to Pakistan in the first place. Since 2002, the country's support for the United States' "war on terrorism" has discredited the government in the eyes of the people – irrespective of their religious or secular orientation. Measures which appeared tactically necessary with regard to Afghanistan are now destabilizing Pakistan. We demand that priority should be given to stabilizing Pakistan over and above other political objectives in the region.

Strengthen the rule of law

The pressure which the United States is exerting on Pakistan to defeat the insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by military means has served to strengthen the political position of the rebels. Development cooperation with Pakistan must concentrate instead on conflict management and prevention and on supporting key areas such as irrigation and energy supply. In the long term, it will be a matter of reforming and at the same time strengthening Pakistan's statehood. As far as the constitutional state is concerned, the mass demonstrations against the dismissal of judges shows that there is a sound basis in society. There is also wide scope for non-governmental organizations in this area. Conservative interpretations of the Sharia are only attractive because the legal system below the level of the Supreme Court is corrupt and ineffective. This absence of reliable state

Intensify the political dialogue with Pakistan

structures provides fertile ground for religious extremists. The Federal Republic should strengthen the political dialogue with Pakistan in addition to intensifying its development policy commitments with a view to reinforcing governance structures.

Elements of a new Iraq policy

Unlike the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there has been a significant reduction in violence in Iraq since the turn of 2006/2007. This is due less to the reinforcement of U.S. troops than to political changes: the self-isolation of the foreign Al-Qaida jihadists, the partial reintegration of the Sunni population into the political system and the fragmentation of the Shiite militia under the preacher Muqtada al Sadr. But the political situation remains unstable and the security situation could once again deteriorate very quickly, as the recent increase in violence in April showed. Participation in power by the Arab Sunnis is still fragile, tensions between the Shiite parties are growing and the danger of division is real. Furthermore, there is also the possibility of a confrontation between the Maliki government and the two Kurdish parties. The economic and social situation remains bleak and the legitimacy of the new political system is in danger.

At the same time, political tensions in the regions are receding, providing new opportunities for cooperation. The Obama administration has started to improve the United States' relations with Syria and Iran. As long as Washington claimed that they were "rogue states" and threatened them with a change of regime, both countries tried in return to take advantage of Iraq's instability to put pressure on the United States. But like Iraq's other neighbours, they share the desire of the United States and Europe to avoid chaos, which would then backfire on them. Neither Syria nor Iran are interested in seeing Sunni jihadist extremism either in Iraq or in the region as a whole.

Expand civil engagement in Iraq quickly

The community of states, the EU and the Federal Republic should expand their engagement in Iraq in those areas which directly benefit the

population. Support for the education system, medical care, aid for refugees and internally displaced persons, the rapid development of economic cooperation and massive support for measures to develop infrastructures could help to facilitate the necessary political dialogue. The improved security situation allows such an approach. Action must be taken quickly to consolidate the country's stabilization.

Involve the regions

These efforts must not be confined to supporting the central government. On the contrary, it is essential to involve the Kurdish autonomous regions, the Sunni regions and South Iraq on an equal basis if one wants to avoid strengthening the lines of conflict in Iraq's fragmented post-war society. We recommend intensifying economic relations and foreign cultural policy in order to end Iraq's isolation and offer the population the prospect of economic recovery.

Encourage dialogues with neighbouring states

Washington's latest moves to resume direct contacts with Syria and Iran deserve support. Not only would Syria and Iran be able to play an important role for stability in Iraq but also in Lebanon and Afghanistan, not to mention their influence on the Middle East conflict. The Federal Republic and the EU should therefore support President Obama's offer to conduct a dialogue with initiatives of their own. The Federal Government should abandon its restraint and introduce bold steps in the follow-up to the visits to Iraq by its foreign and economics ministers.

No peace in sight: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

We have been calling for the EU and the Federal Republic to play a more active role in the Middle East conflict for a long time now. The Gaza War at the turn of the year 2008/2009 showed that a solution to the unrelenting Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still a long way away. The United States and Europe bear considerable responsibility for this situation. They boycotted the new Palestinian government, which had been elected in free and fair elections, drove the Palestinian National Authority into bankruptcy by cutting it off from external sources of funding and exacerbated the rivalry

between Fatah and Hamas, which peaked in the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, they tolerated the economic blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip and thus contributed to the breakdown of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and the Hamas rulers in Gaza. Unwilling to open the border crossings to the Gaza Strip, Israel opted for a war of limited duration to restore security to its southern border regions.

Israel has succeeded in weakening Hamas's fighting strength. But the war has not solved a single problem. Hamas has emerged politically stronger, whereas the authority of the hapless President Abbas, who is supported by the West, has been weakened still further. Despite the ceasefire declared by both sides, the Israeli bombings are continuing as are the missile attacks on Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip.

The conflict cannot be settled by military means. Experience has shown that despite its clear supremacy, Israel is not in the position to force the Palestinians to accept its conditions for an end to the conflict. There are also no signs of a stable ceasefire. This would presuppose offering those Palestinian forces which are reserving the option of an armed struggle against the occupation sufficient incentives to seek a political solution. On the other hand, if it is to end its blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israel needs a guarantee that the paramilitary forces will not take advantage of the open frontiers to rearm themselves. All this is only possible if the Palestinians overcome their split and a government of national unity manages to regain the pre-state monopoly of violence in the entire Palestinian autonomy area and holds elections to restore its basis of legitimacy. Only a government which is not based on emergency decrees but on an elected parliament can present itself to Israel as a credible negotiating partner. However, statements by the Israeli Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister do not suggest that Israel's right-wing nationalist-dominated government wants to see such a strong Palestinian opposite number, which would uphold its aim of a sovereign state with East Jerusalem as its capital – quite the opposite. Israel's partners do, however, have the means to influence the attitudes of the conflict parties. The Bush administration lacked all political will to do so.

Exert pressure on the conflict parties

If the West wants to prevent the next war and salvage the two-state solution, it must revise its conflict management strategy and exert pressure. A clear signal to the Palestinians that the West would recognize and support a government of national unity if they in return would put an end to all violence against Israel, respect existing agreements and accept a two-state solution in line with the peace initiative introduced by the Arab League in 2002 would be a strong incentive for the enemy factions to play out their rivalry by civil means. If the Palestinians succeed in resolving their divide, the West should support the build-up of state institutions and enable power-sharing arrangements, including the integration of the Hamas militias into the security apparatus of the Palestinian National Authority.

Integrate Hamas

Only under this condition can the EU revive its two missions or adapt them constructively. These missions are, on the one hand, the observation of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt in the context of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, which only functioned for a few months and was suspended by the EU following the assumption of power by Hamas in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and, on the other hand, the mission to support police reform within the framework of the "West Bank first" concept, with which the EU inadvertently became an accessory to an increasingly authoritarian system which also used its security forces to dispose of the opposition.

Signal support for a government of unity

Other methods are needed to persuade Israel to finally stop undermining the two-state solution by halting the construction of settlements in the West Bank and lifting the blockade there with its terrible consequences for the Palestinian economy.

Relieve the pressure on the Obama administration

There is no doubt that the United States has a stronger influence on Israel than the EU, but to expect President Obama to make vigorous use of this influence and risk losing the support of the pro-Israeli lobby is probably illusory – the tasks confronting him are too great for him to hazard such a power struggle. We therefore demand that the EU makes bold use of its influence in order to relieve the pressure on its partner in Washington. Israel should only be able to expect a strengthening of relations within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy if it puts an end to its efforts to construct settlements and build the wall in the West Bank – both

Stop the construction of settlements

of which violate international law – and if it dismantles the settlement outposts, which are also illegal under Israeli law. Signals to this effect from the European Parliament and the Foreign Ministers of Luxemburg, Portugal and Finland deserve support from Berlin. Furthermore, several EU states, including Germany, supply weapons to Israel which are used for the purposes of war. This practice is now even more intolerable following the Gaza War. In view of the war crimes which Israel is alleged to have committed in the course of "Operation Cast Lead" and which cannot be verified as long as Israel does not allow an independent enquiry, the EU must apply its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to Israel. This forbids exports of weapons whenever there is a risk that they will be used in violation of humanitarian international law.

Involve Syria and Iran

This crucial change of course must be integrated in regional initiatives. The EU should intensify its dialogue with Syria and Iran. This would be an implicit warning to Israel not to conduct military operations such as its strike against the construction site of a Syrian reactor in 2007 or against Iranian nuclear installations in 2008, for which it requested Washington's support in vain. It would also remind Israel that it should be prepared to return the Syrian Golan Heights, which it has been occupying since 1967. At the same time, the EU could use its engagement as a bargaining tool to persuade Damascus and Teheran to withdraw their support for the military wing of Hamas. The EU has an effective lever vis-à-vis Syria in the form of the Treaty of Association which was suspended in 2004. The EU could ratify the Treaty of Association with Syria providing Syria and Lebanon follow the declarations of their intention to normalize relations with practical steps such as an exchange of ambassadors, the demarcation of borders and a halt to arms smuggling.

War in a failed state: The Democratic Republic of Congo

No country since World War II has suffered as many war victims as the Democratic Republic of Congo and nowhere is there a larger UN mission. 18,430 Blue Helmets and police personnel are working within the framework of MONUC; 5,000 alone in the flashpoint province of North Kivu in the East. But the violence is continuing despite all treaties and the increase in the troop levels of MONUC which has been active since 2001. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MONUC is authorized to use military force in order to prevent killing and expulsion. But it is largely helpless in the face of murdering ethnic militias, marauding soldiers and troops which are supported by third countries. The war in the East of the country has flared up again – more than a quarter of a million people have been driven from their homes in North and South Kivu. The MONUC may be small in relation to the size of the country but what it really lacks is an effective operational strategy.

However, this is not the only problem. The failure of the Goma peace process for both Kivu provinces demands a reassessment of the situation. The neighbouring countries, particularly Ruanda and Uganda, must be obliged to observe their commitments. The division of power between all the actors of violence in a transitional government has led to nepotism and the further inflation and privatization of the state apparatus. The UN has made itself a sponsor of a government in Congo which, although elected, is by no means bound by the principles of a constitutional state. The MONUC supports Kabila's government, whose troops raid and loot just as blatantly as their opponents. Instead it should adopt a neutral stance, protect the people and provide humanitarian aid. The international group of mediators (U.S., EU, AU, UN) and the donor countries must exert more pressure on the conflict parties and take action to ensure that they implement their obligations in accordance with the Goma Agreement. A Special Commissioner for Human Rights in East Congo could name and shame those responsible on both sides for attacks on the civilian population, for the

MONUC must act impartially

Involve the International Criminal Court

use of sexual violence as a military strategy and the recruitment of child soldiers. He or she could also encourage projects to consolidate peace and protect civilians. In so far as the Congolese justice system is not in a position to do this, the International Criminal Court must intervene. Paradoxically, the numerous peace agreements have prevented constructive conflict management because they have consolidated animosity between the communities. This has hindered any form of reconciliation.

The EUFOR Mission, which supported the elections in Congo in 2006, is considered to have been a success because the EU demonstrated its efficiency and at the same time pursued limited objectives. At the time, the mission cost Germany 56 million Euros: the overall costs amounted to U.S. $428 million. The EUSEC and EUPOL missions are active in the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants and in security sector reform. What they lack, however, are reliable partners on the Congolese side. The Kabila regime has misappropriated the major part of the estimated eight million U.S. dollars which external donors have invested in the Congo since 2001. International financial support thus threatens to aggravate the conflict. The fight against corruption and the control of funds take top priority in Congo with its wealth of resources.

Sudan between a peace agreement and a new war

The "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" between North and South Sudan put an end to twenty years of war with two million dead by establishing a joint government involving both sides. This agreement is now threatened with failure because it did not succeed in resolving the status of South Sudan. It foresees a referendum by 2011 at the latest in which it is to be expected that a majority will vote in favour of independence. The South is systematically preparing for this, also in the military sense. The terms of the peace agreement foresaw the demobilization of 180,000 combatants but this remained a mere declaration of intent for all too long. In March 2005, the United Nations set up a mission consisting of approximately 10,000 soldiers

and police personnel and 3,900 civilian staff (UNMIS) to monitor and implement the peace agreement. Nevertheless, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement could prove to be a prelude to the division of the country and could lead to renewed violence because there are no demarcated boundaries. Many people from the South live in the North and conflicts could flare up in the South due to the dominance of the Dinka ethnic group.

Salvage the peace agreement

The repressive Al-Bashir regime, the continuing catastrophic situation in Darfur and the development of secessionist state institutions in the South undermine the *raison d'être* of a united Sudan. The peace agreement has had an unintended effect on the conflict in Darfur: Peace negotiations there will not make any progress as long as the rebels regard the impending independence of the South as a model for Darfur. For six years now, the situation in Darfur has been appalling, despite the UN mission: More than four million people – women and children in particular have been the victims of the violence – are dependent on protection, food, water and psychological support. The end to the war in Darfur and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan are mutually dependent.

Support state structures in the South

Everything possible must be done to save the peace agreement in the short time available before the planned referendum. South Sudan is currently *a* failed state in the making, a landlocked country with oil but without a pipeline and without demarcated national borders with the North. It is essential to accelerate the demobilization of the South Sudan Liberation Army, on the one hand, and to help build up infrastructures and support administrations, on the other – irrespective of whether South Sudan remains part of the federal state or not. The people in all parts of Sudan must sense that the peace process has improved their lot. At the same time, it is essential to cooperate with the neighbouring states to stop supplies of arms from entering the country for the next war. China, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and North Korea, as well as private arms dealers in Great Britain and Ireland, are supplying weapons to Sudan. The embargo imposed by the UN Security Council is half-hearted and thus ineffective – it only refers to direct supplies of weapons to illegal groups in Darfur.

Appoint a Representative for Sudan

The EU's Special Envoy to Sudan must mediate more decisively than in the past. We advise the Federal Government to appoint a Representative for Sudan who should coordinate Germany's foreign, development and security policy and campaign for this policy more resolutely within the EU, the UN and NATO. It is important to heighten awareness of the risks which Sudan's collapse would entail for the whole of Africa.

The United States, the EU and China should work together and take advantage of President Al-Bashir's interest in his own political survival and the popular resentment against his government during the forthcoming 2009 elections to ensure a fairer division of power and resources between Khartoum and the peripheral regions. Participation in the elections must be used as an incentive to persuade the South Sudanese ruling party, the SPLM, to pursue the course of democratization for the whole of Sudan and support national responsibility instead of secession. The collapse of a state in Africa with such precarious borders on almost all sides would have unforeseeable consequences. In the event that these efforts fail, the community of states must be prepared to protect the civilian population from the violence which is likely to ensue.

Ambivalent effects of the global economic crisis

The current world economic crisis is worse than any economic decline that we have witnessed in the last 80 years. It is affecting all countries and could alter the coordinates of international politics in a similarly decisive way to the political upheavals of 1989. This could also have implications for security policy. Admittedly, it is difficult to make predictions; but instability and outbreaks of violence are likely consequences.

Do not encourage (re-)migration

We are already seeing massive (re-)migration movements. Never before have so many people been on the move in order to support their families from afar: approximately 200 million. Many of these labour migrants now see themselves forced to return to their native countries. No one should support this trend as their massive return could destabilize their

native countries. The fact that they are unable to send remittances is seriously exacerbating the economic situation in these countries, which often already suffer from high unemployment and poverty. In 2008, labour migrants transferred an estimated U.S. $283 billion to their native countries, many times more than the figure which the rich states spent on development aid. The loss of this income is upsetting already fragile states even further. It is therefore essential that the budgets for development aid are not reduced but increased; at the same time, development aid and economic support should be better coordinated and used specifically to strengthen endangered sectors of the economy. Comprehensive measures to manage migration are just as necessary as stronger international cooperation to protect migrants. The international community should make an effort to create jobs in developing and emerging countries. This would counteract the crisis and the collapse of further states and would create the basis for future development.

Increase development aid

The crisis is widening the global divide between rich and poor. According to predictions from the World Bank, up to 53 million people could fall below the absolute poverty level of U.S. $2 per day before the end of the year – in addition to those people who already live below this subsistence level. The increasing cost of food and fuel pushed between 130 and 155 million people into poverty in 2008 alone. The United Nations expect the number of people suffering from malnutrition to once again exceed the one billion mark within the next twelve months. This is endangering the Millennium Development Goals, which set out to improve living conditions in the world's poorest regions by 2015. Aid for poor countries and money for development cooperation have been cut despite the fact that a mere fraction of the billions which are currently being spent on dealing with the financial crisis would be sufficient to achieve a significant worldwide turnabout in agriculture which would serve to realize one of the most important Millennium Development Goals: that of halving hunger in the world.

Prevent the undermining of statehood

The economic crisis is preventing the flow of capital into young, emerging economies. The most seriously affected regions are Eastern Europe and Asia, followed by South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Many states are in the midst of a lengthy process of democratization and

stabilization, which the economic crisis is seriously disrupting. The painstaking political, economic and social progress of recent years could be destroyed within months. The community of states must help to prevent the collapse of states by strengthening their legal and police systems. Stable state and social structures are not only needed to put an end to war, but also to avoid further failed states in times of economic crisis.

Despite their asymmetrical production structures, the examples of China and Russia show that the crisis also threatens to seriously upset successful authoritarian states. It jeopardizes the tacit agreement between the regime and the middle classes – money instead of freedom. Initial outbreaks of violence indicate that this balance is suffering considerably. This is all the more so in the case of authoritarian countries which are economically weaker and politically less stable.

Study the relationship between crisis and violence

The economic collapse of authoritarian states would have unforeseeable consequences for global security. Whilst it is reasonable to assume that growing poverty and social injustice would lead to more conflicts and outbreaks of violence, there is no empirical evidence for this assumption in the current crisis. Nevertheless, it must be taken seriously. Peace and conflict research must quickly turn its attention to the relationship between the world economic crisis and potential violent conflicts in order to be able to develop early warning systems and countermeasures. Funding must be provided for relevant projects

Reform the world economy

But every crisis is also an opportunity for a new beginning. Together with the change of government in the United States, the world economic crisis could prove to be the starting point for the serious implementation of global governance – provided international cooperation is forthcoming. What is needed is a fundamental reform of the global economy and a change of course towards products which can survive on the world market in the long term and which will not represent a burden on coming generations due to their harmful effect on the climate. Economic programmes without ecological components would be a mere flash in the pan. This would be wasting the opportunity to make a fresh start.

Seizing the opportunity offered by the Obama government

The election of Barack Obama marked the end of a nightmare: the Bush government's return to war and policies of violence, its disregard for international law and the justification of torture under the pretext of security. The Bush administration relied on its supremacy and the principle of "might makes right", damaged the United Nations, demolished arms controls and increased military expenditure to more than U.S. $700 billion in 2008.

The election of Barack Obama indicates the fundamental change in U.S. society and is an expression of the desire to overcome recent disasters in foreign and security policy. Obama's promise of a new era touches on the emancipatory dimension of American democracy and sets out to restore the credibility of the United States. In his inauguration speech, he paid tribute to the soldiers who fell "in places like Concord or Gettysburg, in Normandy or Khe Sahn" – places of victory over colonialism, slavery, National Socialism and communist North Vietnam. This was certainly intended as a mark of respect towards the United States' military, but it also indicates that the United States' historical memory considers the violent overthrow of unjust regimes to be legitimate. Europeans must come to terms with this fact when the transatlantic communalities are revived.

Put an end to solo efforts

Obama wants to make a fresh start. There was no mention of the "war on terror" in his inaugural speech – an eloquent omission which distinguishes him from his predecessor. The new American President outlined his foreign and security policy during the flurry of world summits in Europe at the beginning of April 2009 – the NATO anniversary, a meeting between the EU and the United States, the G20, talks with China's State President Hu Jintao and with Dmitri Medvedev, the Russian President, as well as with Abdullah Gül, the President of the Turkish Republic. He spoke of the end of solo efforts, listening instead of commanding, international cooperation, the revival of arms controls, disarmament. The signals were clear: No single nation can tackle today's global challenges

alone, not even the mighty United States. The global economic crisis, the end to the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East, climate change – all these problems call for a joint effort. States, in particular the powerful and the rich, must develop to become the much-cited community of states. This means that the crisis in transatlantic relations also offers an opportunity for what political scientists label global governance and what Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier calls a "global partnership of shared responsibility".

The climax of these summits as far as peace policy was concerned was Obama's speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, in which he adopted one of the old visions of peace research: a world free of nuclear weapons. This is seen as the only possibility to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The fact that the President of the global superpower, the United States, is demanding a world without nuclear weapons is a trumpet call. It affects many issues which have always been considered cast-iron certainties of politics in the nuclear age – e.g. faith in the nuclear deterrent – even though Obama emphasizes how stony the road to this goal will be. It is not surprising that self-appointed realists deride his "idealism" and "utopianism". Our reply to these disbelievers is that the abolition of slavery was also once considered utopian.

Support new multilateralism

Europe's politicians and the European public are fascinated by the new President. They gaze at him, half relieved at the end of the Bush era, half filled with fear and doubt that the new boy may merely represent old policies in a new wrapping. We are convinced that the Europeans should not simply take a back seat. It is in their vital interests that this new multilateralism and nuclear disarmament actually succeed.

The situation is reminiscent of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik in 1986: Suddenly the leaders of the enemy superpowers realized the madness of the nuclear arms race. Disarmament, which had previously been scorned as utopian and idealistic, no longer seemed impossible. It soon became clear, however, just how easily such opportunities can be squandered.

Many of the proposals and ideas which we have regularly put forward in the Peace Report are on today's political agenda. It is now a matter of realizing this vision. The Europeans can influence the success or failure of

Obama's new beginning – through arms controls, curbing arms exports, security cooperation and confidence building, but in particular by playing an active role in ending the wars in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Sudan and Congo. Should the new beginning fail, the pendulum in the United States could swing back. At the moment, however, the global situation seems extraordinarily open to change. The European side should let itself be carried along by this new wave of confidence.

Reviving disarmament and arms control

Promote non-proliferation through disarmament

The change of government in the United States opens up new prospects for disarmament and for the control of nuclear weapons. The main items on Barack Obama's agenda are the revival of nuclear arms control with Russia, the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a verifiable treaty banning the production of weapons-capable fissile material. In addition, an international initiative for a verifications system to ensure the comprehensive safety of all nuclear weapons-capable materials is intended as a measure to reduce the risk of a terror attack using nuclear weapons. This ambitious agenda is based *inter alia* on the conviction that the community of states will only cooperate to overcome the current non-proliferation crisis if the nuclear powers significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals in return.

Save the NPT

The Review Conference, which is due to take place in May 2010, will show whether it has actually been possible to put the "deal" laid down in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – disarmament in exchange for the renunciation of nuclear weapons – on a new footing. The NPT is facing a crisis in three respects: (1) Nuclear disarmament is stagnating. (2) The regime in Teheran is refusing to cooperate unconditionally with the Atomic Energy Agency; North Korea has even withdrawn from the Treaty, tested a nuclear weapon in 2006 and has recently expelled international nuclear inspectors. (3) The risk of proliferation increases with the international expansion of the civilian use of nuclear energy– also because the 188

members have so far not been able to agree on more effective controls. Many non-nuclear weapons states, for example, are not prepared to sign an Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreement and to grant the International Atomic Energy Agency increased inspection rights until the nuclear weapons states agree to further disarmament.

Draw up an EU nuclear disarmament policy

Following a new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia, the U.S. President wants to include all the nuclear powers in the process of arms control. Whether he will also involve the *de facto* nuclear weapons states, which do not belong to the official "club" of the five nuclear powers, remained open at the meeting in Prague. In the meantime, the new U.S. Secretary of State, who is also chief negotiator for nuclear disarmament, has made it clear: The United States aims to ensure that India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea also observe the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The proposed multilateralization of nuclear arms controls is also putting the willingness of the nuclear powers France and Great Britain to the test. London has recently shown itself to be open to negotiations on disarmament, but Paris has so far failed to signalize any such willingness. Reaching a uniform position on disarmament which would also inspire the NPT Review Conference is a challenge facing the EU.

The announced reduction in the role of nuclear weapons also affects Germany's security policy. Like the other members of NATO (with the exception of France), Germany participates in determining the Alliance's nuclear weapons policy in the Nuclear Planning Group. This policy is currently being examined within the framework of a review of the Strategic Concept, which was commissioned at the NATO summit at the beginning of April. Germany is one of five non-nuclear weapons states where U.S. nuclear weapons are stationed. In exchange, Germany is providing Tornado combat aircraft as carriers in the context of its "nuclear participation". The withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Germany, which Foreign Minister Steinmeier supported in a statement on 10 April 2009, would tie in with the new disarmament agenda and would make German efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime more credible. However, the Federal Government is not following a clear line on this question. We appeal to the Government to cooperate with other countries on the new Strategic Concept and to insist

on an end to nuclear participation. The Alliance should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.

Conventional arms control is of strategic importance to Europe, in contrast to the United States. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has ensured stability and transparency since 1990 and has paved the way for a cooperative security policy. But this achievement is now at risk as NATO has not ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE), which was signed in 1999, because Russia has not completely withdrawn its troops from Georgia and Moldova. Russia, on the other hand, demonstrated its annoyance by suspending the CFE Treaty in December 2007. It is now a matter of breaking this blockade. The NATO states should ratify the ACFE unconditionally – they cannot force the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia through non-cooperation but must try to achieve this goal by other methods. Russia should withdraw its bogus demands regarding the flank rule so that the ACFE can enter into effect. The Treaty States should then immediately begin to negotiate a new agreement, taking Russia's demands into account.

Ratify the ACFE Treaty

The difficult relationship with Russia

The first decade of the new millennium has been a waste of time as far as improved relations with Russia are concerned. It has been full of conflicts and crises. This applies to NATO expansion and arms controls as well as to regional conflicts, questions of energy and estrangement with regard to political values. Eight years of American unilateralism, which regarded Russian as a *quantité négligeable*, Russia's fears of isolation and the crass new self-confidence which Moscow often demonstrates contributed to this situation. Twenty years after the end of the East-West confrontation, Russia is still not reliably integrated into the institutional network of European and global security policy.

Organize joint security

The tense relations with Russia are contrary to the interests of all concerned. The United States needs Russia's cooperation for its new foreign

Revitalize the OSCE

policy approach – in fields ranging from nuclear disarmament to Russia's commitment with regard to Iran's nuclear policy and cooperation in the UN Security Council. As far as Europe is concerned, Russia is a neighbour, its main supplier of energy, an important market and a regional security partner. Russia, in turn, needs the West and the EU states in particular for its modernization if it wants to reduce its dependence on exports of raw materials and overcome its structural deficits. These are the preconditions for a grand bargain between the West and Russia. As these interests only partially coincide, stability between the West and Russia can only be achieved in a long-term process which is supported by the vision of joint and cooperative security as laid down in the CSCE Charter of Paris in 1990. This vision has still not been realized with regard to Russia, the former enemy, which is still the second largest nuclear power.

Revitalize the OSCE

The OSCE could provide a forum for improving the West's relations with Russia in the short term. It remains the vitalizing, normative-political linchpin between the Europe of the EU, the United States and Russia and has maintained a "culture of dialogue" in the two decades since the end of the East-West conflict. This is important in order to prevent the increasing number of divides between East and West from becoming deeper. On the contrary, these rifts can be bridged or at least allayed through dialogue – not only in the field of security.

Develop new instruments for crisis response

The war in Georgia in August 2008 not only revealed the need to reform the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO, it also exposed weaknesses in European foreign and security policy. Conflict prevention failed, the "frozen" conflict became a war before the very eyes of the observer mission without there having been any serious attempts to mediate beforehand. It is now vital to prevent a repeat of the ethnic displacements, military build-up in the conflict region, the violation of ceasefires and unilateral changes to borders – otherwise the principles of the OSCE will suffer permanent damage. Crisis reaction mechanisms must be developed, the mandates of international organizations extended, including the establishment of demilitarized buffer zones; furthermore, we need verification of the observance of ceasefires backed by sanctions as well as high-level negotiations to clarify questions of status.

The first step must be to introduce confidence-building measures because distrust and conflicting security perceptions are too great. Both the recent NATO manoeuvres in Georgia and Russia's treaty commitment to protect the borders of the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia require urgent action. Some NATO states could ratify the ACFE Treaty unconditionally. Russia, for its part, could at least participate in parts of the CFE's exchange of information below the level of suspending the Treaty. Parallel to this, the West and Russia should seek an early solution to the Transnistria conflict in the Republic of Moldova. The level of violence there has been low for a long time, but its links with the CFE make this conflict important.

Encourage arms control

The EU, NATO, their Member States and Russia should begin immediate negotiations on arms control. It would be an important breakthrough if the United States and Russia could agree on a framework agreement for the START Treaty by July 2009. A similar treaty is also needed in the field of conventional arms control – an issue which is no less important for the Europeans. The initiative for this must come from Europe. Finally, it is essential that progress be made in the negotiations on an EU partnership agreement with Russia and on the depoliticization of energy questions.

Involve Russia

Russia must be permanently involved in European security structures – particularly by upgrading the NATO-Russia Council. At least this body was meeting again at the end of April. We suggest gradually increasing the relevance of the EU at the expense of NATO. The Alliance should postpone a third round of enlargement, concentrate on its central function of collective defence, exercise restraint when taking on new tasks and recognize the supremacy of the UN Security Council. A key task of the EU involves finding a way to consolidate cooperation with Russia in order to overcome the differences between "old" and "new" Europe as well as between small and large EU states in the longer term. Now that the "leaden years" in Washington are over, we have been given a second chance to rid Europe of its old divisions.

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